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I. INTRODUCTION
A recurring fact pattern in employment relations involves the interroga-
tion of employees by management in conjunction with an investigation of
some nature. Common situations include the following:
Management experiences shortages of materials and decides to interrogate
each employee working in the division where shortages occurred. Most, but
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not all, employees willingly participate in the investigation. Employees who
refuse to answer management's questions are discharged.
Criminal charges are brought against two on-duty firefighters who, while
working at a fair, allegedly sexually assaulted a 17-year-old woman. The
department decides to conduct an investigation. Fearing that the state's
attorney will act on anything they say, the alleged assailants refuse to answer
management's questions and cite their fifth-amendment rights. The employees
are terminated for sexual assault and failure to cooperate in an investigation.
An employee is suspected of being under the influence after a serious
work-related accident. Management requests that the employee undergo a
drug and a polygraph test, both of which are refused. The employee is
discharged for refusing to submit to testing even though the parties' collective
bargaining agreement is silent on the issue of drug and polygraph testing.
A school district charges a teacher with the theft of a copying machine.
A grievance is filed and the case proceeds to arbitration under a tenure-teacher
termination statute. At the arbitration hearing the school district calls the
teacher as its first witness. The teacher's attorney objects to having his client
be a witness for the other side. The employer argues that if the teacher does
not testify, she will be terminated for failure to cooperate in an on-going
investigation.
To what extent can an employee assert a fifth-amendment defense or
otherwise refuse a demand to cooperate with an investigation of work-related
misconduct? Does it make a difference whether the investigation requires a
drug screen or a polygraph examination? Suppose the employee works for a
government. When, if ever, will a labor arbitrator recognize a privilege for
an employee who elects not to tell management his side of the story, either at
an investigation or in a subsequent arbitration hearing? Even though an
arbitrator recognizes a privilege, may (or should) an arbitrator draw an adverse
inference from an employee's refusal to testify? What about an employee who
has information, but, for whatever reason, refuses management's request to
come forward and tell what he knows at an arbitration hearing? Is a refusal
to cooperate in any form protected under the National Labor Relations Act?
This Article will address these and similar issues that arise when an
employee elects not to cooperate in the face of a legitimate investigation by
his employer. Part II reviews the law in the public sector regarding the rights
and obligations of employees and employers in employment-related investiga-
tions. Part III focuses on the decisions of labor arbitrators. Interpreting "just
cause" dismissal provisions contained in both public and private-sector
collective bargaining agreements,' labor arbitrators "enter the woods" when
1. Recent survey reports by the Bureau of National Affairs ("BNA"), Inc., reveal
that discharge and discipline provisions are found in 96 percent of collective
bargaining agreements analyzed-99 percent in manufacturing and 92 percent in non-
[Vol. 56
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management disciplines or discharges employees for refusing to cooperate (the
term often used is "insubordination") and unions challenge the action through
the negotiated grievance procedure.2 The Article concludes with a policy
manufacturing. BNA also reports that grounds-for-discharge provisions, found in 94
percent of their sample, are generally of two types-discharge for "cause" or "just
cause" (found in 86 percent of the agreements), or discharge for a specific offense
(found in 75 percent of the contracts in the database). BASIC PATrRNs IN UNION
CONTRACrS (12th ed. 1989).
Even if no "just cause" provision is found in the collective bargaining agreement,
the better weight of authority holds that absent a clear indication to the contrary, a just
cause standard is implied in the labor agreement. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Tire Co.,
36 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 552, 556 (1961) (Ryder, Arb.); Feller, The Remedy Power in
Grievance Arbitration, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 128, 134-35 (1982).
Despite the high frequency of arbitration cases dealing with discharge and
discipline (about one out of three grievances deals with discharge or discipline), few
contracts contain a definition of "just cause." While no set criteria exists, arbitrators
have uniformly held that any determination of just cause requires two separate
considerations: (1) whether the employee is guilty of misconduct or a serious or faulty
lapse in job performance, and (2) assuming guilt, whether the discipline imposed is a
reasonable penalty under the circumstances of the case.
Abrams and Nolan propose that "[j]ust cause ... embodies the idea that the
employee is entitled to continued employment, provided he attends work regularly,
obeys work rules, performs at some reasonable level of quality and quantity, and
refrains from interfering with his employer's business by his activities on or off the
job." Abrams & Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline
Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 601.
The universal rule in grievance arbitration is that the employer must carry the
burden of proof of just cause in a discharge case.
2. Disputes submitted to arbitration by unions and management are of two types:
"interest" and "rights" disputes. Interest disputes involve disagreements over the terms
of new collective bargaining agreements. "Rights" or grievance disputes concern
disagreements over the meaning of the terms of an existing labor agreement. Most
arbitration involves rights or contract interpretation disputes, although interest disputes
are frequently arbitrated in the public sector. Also, arbitration can be either compulsory
or voluntary. Compulsory arbitration occurs when the parties are legally mandated to
arbitrate a dispute. Voluntary arbitration occurs when the parties agree to submit a
dispute to an arbitrator. Compulsory arbitration imposes a specific process as a matter
of law or decree. When arbitration is voluntary, the parties are free to formulate their
own arbitration procedures. Most grievance arbitration is voluntary, either because the
parties have agreed in advance to arbitrate all contract interpretation disputes or
because the parties agree to arbitrate a particular dispute.
When the arbitrator issues a decision (also called an award), it may be final and
binding, or it may be advisory. Most labor arbitration in the United States, and the
type of arbitration referred to in this Article, is voluntary contract interpretation
arbitration with the award being final and binding. Most authorities simply refer to this
1991]
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statement concerning what rule of law and focus arbitrators should adopt when
confronted with duty to cooperate cases. Although public-sector cases
recognize a privilege and apply fifth-amendment law more readily than
private-sector cases, our thesis is that labor arbitrators deciding cases in the
private sector should not recognize an employee's right to some fifth-
amendment types of testimonial privilege. Rather, arbitrators should
acknowledge an employee's obligation to truthfully provide management with
information. Recognition of an employee's right to stand silent should be
forthcoming only in those 'situations where the questions do not relate to the
performance of the employee's official duties.
II. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES IN PUBLIC-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
A. Review of Case Law
In part, the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states "no
person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against
himself."3 This constitutional provision stems from an historical denounce-
ment of the ecclesiastical inquisitions, which forced defendants to admit guilt
or face "eternal damnation."4 Based on this theory, the amendment was
designed to provide protection from compelled testimony that would later be
used to convict. From these beginnings, however, the fifth amendment has
traversed many areas of legal jurisprudence.
In Malloy v. Hogan,6 the Supreme Court applied the provisions of the
fifth amendment to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Malloy, the Court recognized the incongruity of having
type of arbitration as "compulsory arbitration" because the parties are compelled under
the collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate the grievance and recognize the award
as final and binding. See generally Hill & Sinicropi, Improving the Arbitration
Process: A Primer for Advocates, 27 WILLAmETE L. REV. 463 (1991).
3. The fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads in full:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, in time of War or public dangei;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. v.
4. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1976).
5. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804-05 (1977).
6. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
[Vol. 56
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different standards determine the validity of a fifth-amendment privilege
"based on the same feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim was
asserted in a state or federal court."7 Accordingly, identical standards
determine whether an individual's silence in either a federal or state
proceeding is justified.
The language of the fifth amendment specifically limits the right against
self-incrimination to cases concerning criminal charges. The amendment,
however, has been applied liberally to cases where the issues merely touch
criminal concerns. During the last twenty years, the progressive translation
of the fifth amendment has been catapulted by the fourteenth amendment.
One of the fifth amendment's most attenuated applications arose in the public
employment law setting. The extension of the fourteenth amendment's
protection to the public employee was confronted by the Supreme Court for
the first time in Garrity v. New Jersey. In Garrity a group of municipal
police officers were the target of investigations of traffic ticket fixing by the
New Jersey Attorney General's Office. At the beginning of interrogations,
each officer was warned that "(1) anything he said might be used against him
in any state criminal proceeding; (2) that he had the privilege to refuse to
answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate him; but (3) that if he
refused to answer he would be subject to removal from office."9 The officers
7. Id. at 11.
8. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
9. A New Jersey state statute provided the following:
Any person holding or who has held any elective or appointive public
office, position or employment (whether state, county or municipal), who
refuses to testify upon matters relating to the office, position or employment
in any criminal proceeding wherein he is a defendant or is called as a
witness on behalf of the prosecution, upon the ground that his answer may
tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a witness against himself or
refuses to waive immunity when called by a grand jury to testify thereon
or who willfully refuses or fails to appear before any court, commission or
body of this state which has the right to inquire under oath upon matters
relating to the office, position or employment of such person or who,
having been sworn, refuses to testify or to answer any material question
upon the ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel
him to be a witness against himself, shall, if holding elective or public
office, position or employment, be removed therefrom or shall there by
forfeit his office, position or employment and any vested or future right of
tenure or pension granted to him by any law of this state provided the
inquiry relates to a matter which occurred or arose within the preceding five
years. Any person so forfeiting his office, position or employment shall not
thereafter be eligible for election or appointment to any public office,
position or employment in this state.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965) (quoted in Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494 n.1).
1991]
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answered the questions even though they were not offered a grant of
immunity. Over objections, some of the evidence revealed by the questions
was later used in criminal proceedings for "conspiracy to obstruct the
administration of the traffic laws."10
The officers' convictions were subsequently upheld in the face of claims
that evidence obtained in the interrogations was "coerced."" The officers
argued that if they had refused to answer, they would have lost their jobs.12
Thus, one of the issues facing the Supreme Court was whether statements
obtained under the fear of being discharged for the failure to answer questions
were products of coercion.'" As a preliminary concern, however, the Court
was asked to define the perimeters of coercion.' 4 Recognizing that coercion
could be both mental and physical,'5 the Court stated, "the question is
whether the accused was deprived of his "free choice to admit, to deny, or to
refuse to answer. 1 6 Justice Douglas, writing for a 6-3 majority, pointed out
that the choice given the 'employees was either to forfeit their jobs or to
incriminate themselves, and "the option to lose their means of livelihood or
to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak
out or to remain silent.'
7
The Court found that the choice "between the rock and the whirlpool"
constituted coercion and could not be sustained as voluntary under prior
decisions. 8 Concluding that "policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not
required to a watered-down version of constitutional rights,"' 9 the Court held
that the fifth amendment protected the officers from having coerced statements
used in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Justice Harlan, in a forceful dissent, opposed the Court's apparent
declaration that the "condition" placed on the officers to respond to the
questions or lose their jobs made the statements "involuntary as a matter of
fact."20 Further, according to Harlan, the holding that the statements were
"inadmissible as a matter of law on the premise that they were products of an
10. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 495.
11. Id. at 494-95.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 495.
14. Id.
15. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940).
16. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241
(1941)).
17. Id. at 497.
18. Id. at 498.
19. Id. at 500.
20. Id. at 501-02 (Harlan J., dissenting).
[Vol. 56
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/1
EMPLOYEES AND INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
impermissible condition imposed on the constitutional privilege" is suspect.2'
Justice Harlan responded that "[t]he majority is apparently engaged in the
delicate task of riding two unruly horses at once."22
Justice Harlan drew support for his contention from Davis v. North
Carolina.a In Davis, the Court stated that voluntariness is determined by
whether the accused's decision "was overborne by the sustained pressures
upon him."24 Justice Harlan went on to apply facts in Garrity that the
majority ignored. Harlan noted that all of the statements made by petitioners
were taken in a room in a fire station, and when the depositions were taken,
none of the officers were in custody.25 Further, Harlan pointed to the court
reporter's testimony that no indications of "unwillingness" were apparent. 26
Under this evidence record, Harlan concluded that as a matter of fact, "there
[was] no basis for saying that any of these statements were made involuntari-
ly."27 With respect to the question whether the statements were inadmissible
because they were "involuntary as a matter of law," Harlan reasoned that this
query involves the question of "whether the condition imposed by the State
on the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, namely dismissal
from office, in this instance serves in itself to render the statements inadmissi-
ble."' 8 Taking the side of the employer, Harlan found that "nothing in logic
or purposes of the privilege demands that all consequences which may result
from a witness' silence be forbidden merely because that silence is privi-
leged."'29 In Harlan's view, the majority's holding "extends the scope of the
privilege beyond its essential purposes, and seriously hampers the protection
of other important values."3 The majority position precludes a sanction
(discharge) "which presents, at least on its face, no hazard to the purpose of
the constitutional privilege, and which may reasonably be expected to serve
important public interests."31 Unlike the majority, Harlan found no legal
infirmity in dismissing a police officer who declines, on the grounds of
privilege, to disclose information pertinent to his public responsibilities.32
21. Id. at 501.
22. Id.
23. 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
24. Ild. at 739; Garrity, 385 U.S. at 505.
25. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 506 (Harlan J., dissenting).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 506.
28. Id. at 507.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 508.
31. 1d
32. In a footnote, Harlan pointed out that Judge Jerome Frank, in defense of the
privilege, stated that it would be entirely permissible to discharge police officers who
1991]
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In the emerging law of public employment, the Garrity decision raised
as many issues as it purported to solve. Foremost of these was whether the
right against self-incrimination, as recognized by Garrity, was limited to
situations where the public official was not granted immunity. In 1968,
however, the Supreme Court faced this exact issue in Gardner v. Broderick.3
In Gardner, a New York City police officer was discharged because he
refused to "waive his privilege against self-incrimination." 4 The waiver was
in connection with a New York County grand jury investigation of bribery and
corruption in connection with unlawful gambling operations.3 5 The police
officer in Gardner was told that if he did not sign the waiver, he would be
fired 6
The issue faced by the Court was whether a state may discipline or
discharge an officer for refusing to waive his fifth amendment right.37 The
Court recognized that "[t]he privilege may be waived in appropriate circum-
decline to disclose relevant information. Harlan quoted Frank as follows:
Duty required them to answer. Privilege permitted them to refuse to
answer. They chose to exercise the privilege, but the exercise of such
privilege was wholly inconsistent with their duty as police officers. They
claim they had a constitutional right to refuse to answer under the
circumstances, but ... they had no constitutional right to remain police
officers in the face of their clear violation of the duty imposed upon them.
Id. at 509 n.3 (quoting United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1951) (court's
emphasis)).
33. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
34. Id. at 274.
35. Id.
36. Id. New York City Charter § 1123 provided that:
If any councilman or other officer or employee of the city shall, after lawful
notice of process, willfully refuse or fail to appear before any court or
judge, any legislative committee, or any officer, board or body authorized
to conduct any hearing or inquiry, or having appeared shall refuse to testify
or to answer any question regarding the property, government or affairs of
the city or of any county included within its territorial limits, or regarding
the nomination, election, appointment or official conduct or any officer or
employee of the city or any such county, on the ground that his answer
would tend to incriminate him, or shall refuse to waive immunity from
prosecution on account of any such matter in relation to which he may be
asked to testify upon any such hearing or inquiry, his term or tenure of
office or employment shall terminate and such office or employment shall
be vacant, and he shall not be eligible to election or appointment to any
office or employment under the city or any agency.
N.Y. CITY CHART. § 1123 (1966).
37. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 273.
[Vol. 56
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stances if the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.0 8 Further, the
Court expounded the underlying theory of today's immunity doctrine by
stating that "[a]nswers may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there
is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits
in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying."39
The Court compared the facts of Gardner to Spevack v. Klein.4" In
Spevack, the Court ruled that a lawyer could not be disciplined solely because
he refused to testify at a disciplinary proceeding.4' In an attempt to draw a
distinction, however, the City of New York argued that "unlike the lawyer, [a
police officer] is directly, immediately, and entirely responsible to the city or
state which is his employer." 4' The City further argued that a police officer
"owes his entire loyalty to [the city]" and he is "a trustee of the public
interest.
,43
The Court in Gardner agreed with management and reasoned that if a
policeman had
refused to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to
the performance of his official duties, without being required to waive his
immunity with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a
criminal prosecution of himself... the privilege against self-incrimination
would not have been a bar to his dismissal.44
In Gardner, however, the issue was not whether the officer refused to answer
questions. The employee was dismissed because he failed to waive his
constitutional right. 45  Accordingly, the Court found that because the
testimony demanded by the city was intended to be used in a criminal
proceeding, a discharge for failure to waive his fifth amendment rights could
not stand.46
On the same day that Gardner was handed down, a companion case was
decided. In Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commissioner of
Sanitation,47 a number of sanitation workers were dismissed from employ-
ment with the City of New York for refusing to testify in front of the
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
41. Id. at 511-13.
42. Id. at 513-15.
43. Id.
44. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
1991]
9
Hill and Wright: Hill: Employee Refusals to Cooperate in Internal Investigations
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Commissioner of Investigation of New York City. 4  Most of the workers
refused to testify. A few of the workers, however, testified without immuni-
ty.4' The Court's opinion paralleled that of Gardner. The Court stated that
public-sector employees subject themselves to discharge if they refuse to
account for their performance "after proper proceedings, which do not involve
an attempt to coerce them to relinquish their constitutional rights."50 The
obvious implications of this statement was that "proper proceedings" related
to the grant of criminal immunity.
Garrity, Gardner, and-Sanitation Men constitute the foundation of the
fifth-amendment right against self-incrimination for public employees. Under
current law it is improper to compel an employee to waive his constitutional
rights in a criminal proceeding by threat of dismissal. It is, however, proper
for an agency to demand an accounting of a public employee's performance
of his duties even though criminal activities may be involved. A refusal to
give such an accounting may then be deemed to be insubordination. Thus,
even though the municipality may not force the employee to waive his
constitutional right against self-incrimination, it may grant the employee
immunity and then dismiss for insubordination if no accounting is forthcom-
ing.
1. The Granting of Immunity
As noted in Gardner, testimony may be compelled if immunity is granted
from criminal prosecution. This central issue in the right against self-
incrimination was faced four years after Gardner in Kastigar v. United
States.51 In Kastigar the issue was whether the federal government "can
compel testimony from an unwilling witness who invokes the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by conferring (on the
witness) immunity ... from use of the compelled testimony in subsequent
criminal proceedings .... ,, The government had conferred immunity on
the defendants under a provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
which essentially provided that neither the compelled testimony nor the
information derived from the grant of immunity could be used in a subsequent
criminal proceeding. 3 The Kastigar Court tempered the government's power
48. Id. at 280-81.
49. Id. at 281-82.
50. Id. at 282.
51. 406 U.S. 441, reh'g denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972).
52. Id. at 442.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988) reads as follows:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
[Vol. 56
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to compel testimony. It first observed that an important power of the state to
assure the effective functioning of government is to compel residents to testify
in court or before grand juries."' The Court then noted that a number of
exceptions from the testimonial duty exist.5 5 The foremost is the fifth
amendment's right against self-incrimination which, the Court notes, "can be
asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial,
investigatory or adjudicatory .... ,,56 The Court, however, in light of prior
decisions, 7 refused to find that immunity statutes were unconstitutional on
their face.5 8 Further, the Court stated that "while a grant of immunity must
afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not
be broader."59 The Court denied the defendant's argument that only transac-
tion immunity' would pass constitutional muster.
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham6 parallels this decision. In Leflcowitz, a New
York election law prohibited a person from holding public office, if while
holding an office, the person declined to waive his right to immunity from the
use of his testimony. 62 The Court held that a witness may "refuse to answer
unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled
answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case is
or ancillary to
1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
2) an agency of the United States, or
3) either House of the Congress, a joint committee of the two
Houses, or a committee of subcommittee of either house,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any informa-
tion directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the
order.
54. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 442-43.
55. Id. at 444 (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919)).
56. Id.
57. Ullmann v. United States, 505 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591 (1896).
58. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 451-52.
59. Id. at 453.
60. Id. Transactional immunity would provide immunity from all prosecution for
the offense compelled to testify about.
61. 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
62. Id. at 803-04.
1991]
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which he is a defendant."6' The Court reiterated that the government cannot
punish an employee's use of the fifth amendment by threatening discharge or
other punishment unless the testimony has been immunized.64  Once
immunity is granted, however, the state may use its contempt powers to
compel the testimony concerning the conduct of public employees in office,
"without forfeiting the opportunity to prosecute the witness on the basis of
evidence derived from other sources."' 6
Clearly immunity is constitutional. Further, a person may be held in civil
or criminal contempt for failure to testify after immunity is granted. Once
immunity is granted, being forced to testify is not the same as being forced
to waive the right against self-incrimination. As the Court noted in Kastigar,
immunity statutes have their historical roots in Anglo-American jurisprudence
and are not incompatible with fifth-amendment values. Rather, immunity
seeks "a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and
the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.', 66
2. The Requirement of an Affirmative Grant of Immunity
An issue that has emerged after Garrity and Gardner is under what
circumstances is the testimony of a public employee automatically immunized
from use in later criminal proceedings. That is, can the state be precluded
from using the statements given by an employee in an investigation when the
employer and state's attorney do not explicitly declare that immunity is given?
Further, if the testimony is coerced during the investigation and no immunity
is given, must the employee cooperate in the investigation? The Supreme
Court has yet to directly face the issue. Many lower courts, however, have
considered the use of an employee's statement where no affirmative grant of
immunity was given.
In United States v. Devitt,67 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that disciplinary action cannot be taken for refusing to testify "unless [the
employee] is first advised that, consistent with the holding in Garrity,
evidence obtained as a result of his testimony will not be used against him in
subsequent criminal proceedings."' Similarly, in Confederation of Police v.
Conlisk,69 the Seventh Circuit held that a public employer may dismiss an
employee for refusing to answer questions "where the employer both asks
63. Id. at 805.
64. Id. at 806.
65. Id. at 809.
66. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 445-46 (footnote omitted).
67. 499 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975).
68. Id. at 137.
69. 489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1974).
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specific questions relating to the employee's official duties and advises the
employee of the consequences of his choice, i.e., that failure to answer will
result in dismissal but that answers he gives and fruits thereof cannot be used
against him in criminal proceedings."7
Likewise, in D'Acquisto v. Washington,7' the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed the issue of whether
disciplinary action could be taken against a police officer who invokes his
fifth-amendment right.7' The court pointed out that immunity must be
affirmatively granted.73 In D'Acquisto, Chicago police officers were accused
of criminal and internal offenses.74 While being interrogated by police
personnel, the officers refused to give information until they obtained
assurance from the state's attorney that they would not be prosecuted.7 5 The
officers were suspended for "disobeying an order to speak and [for] failure to
cooperate with an investigation." 76 In addressing the dismissal, the court
noted that courts considering the question have held that no affirmative grant
of immunity from prosecuting authority is necessary.77 These courts reason
that the privilege against self-incrimination affords a form of use-immunity
that attaches automatically as a matter of law when a public employer compels
incriminating statements. The logic runs as follows. The Supreme Court has
held that the threat of being fired is sufficient to constitute compulsion of the
statements. As a matter of law, compelled statements cannot be used against
their maker in a criminal proceeding. Therefore, as a matter of law the
statements cannot be used regardless of whether immunity has been granted
expressly.78 The D'Acquisto court rejected this logic in favor of an affirma-
tive grant of immunity.79
Hov~ever persuasive the logic, the Supreme Court's language in more
than one opinion on employee statements speaks of an affirmative grant of use
immunity.80 The language of Seventh Circuit opinions also appears to
70. Id. at 893.
71. 640 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. IlM. 1986).
72. Id. at 594-95.
73. Id.






80. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977) ("Once proper use
immunity is granted .... "); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973) ("[the
employee] may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least
against the use of his compelled answers [and] ... states must offer to the witness
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require that employees first be affirmatively advised that they will have use-
immunity if they speak.
As both the Fifth Circuit and Judge Marshall of this district read this
language, the cases mean that the employee must have an affirmative
assurance of immunity before an employer can demand answers. They do not
appear to require specifically a communication from the prosecutor. The
employer, it would seem, can do the advising. Officers under interrogation,
however, are not expected to know the ins and outs of fifth amendment law,
and they should not have to guess whether they have criminal immunity for
their statements.
Other circuits have faced the issue as well.8' As pointed out in
D'Acquisto, the Fifth Circuit has indirectly adopted the Seventh Circuit's
holding. It has been able, however, to skirt the issue directly. In Gulden v.
McCorkle,8 two employees (Gulden and Sage) of the Dallas Public Works
Department were discharged because they refused to submit to a polygraph
exam. The plaintiffs argued that the city had failed to "tender them immunity
in regard to use of their polygraph answers in subsequent criminal proceed-
ings."' The city contended that at all times during the polygraph testing, the
plaintiffs' right against self-incrimination was present. Therefore, according
to the city, an active grant of immunity was not required.
Plaintiff-employees Gulden and Sage did not claim that the city explicitly
requested that they waive immunity. The court noted that plaintiffs claimed
that case law "mandate[d] that once they articulated their fifth amendment
concerns, the Defendants were required to make an affirmative tender of
immunity before a polygraph exam could be required."" The court found
no support for this theory. According to the Fifth Circuit, the employees were
not entitled to an affirmative tender of immunity before they could be required
to submit to a polygraph exam for the purpose of inquiring about a bomb
threat received by their employer. The court reasoned that because "the inquiry
had not advanced to a level of specificity in which the competing concerns of
immunity could be properly addressed.., it was sufficient that the employees
were told that they must take the polygraph exam to retain employment."'
whatever immunity is required. ....").
81. The Second Circuit has stated that "the employee is [to be] duly advised of
his options and the consequences of his choice." Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc.
v. Commission of Sanitation of New York, 426 F.2d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972).
82. 680 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
83. Id. at 1071.
84. Id. at 1074.
85. Id. at 1076.
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While the law is unsettled in this area, clearly if statements are compelled
without any corresponding grant of immunity, the employee can claim that
those statements are barred from use in subsequent criminal proceedings.
Without a grant of immunity, however, the courts hold that an employee need
not cooperate. Thus, management will never obtain an accounting and the
employee cannot be dismissed for not cooperating.
3. Blunier v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners:'
The Law Applied
A 1989 decision from the Appellate Court of Illinois illustrates the
complexities involved when employees are asked for an accounting. The
procedural history is somewhat complex. Firefighters Ochs and Blunier were
charged before the Peoria Fire and Police Commission with raping a 17-year-
old woman while on duty and with insubordination for refusing to answer
questions about the incident in the course of an internal investigation. 7 The
Commission found them guilty on all charges and discharged them from the
Department.' The circuit court reversed the Commission on the rape charge,
affirmed the Commission on the charges of insubordination, but reversed on
the penalty of discharge, and remanded for the imposition of a lesser
penalty.89 After first refusing to comply with the circuit court's order, and
after further court proceedings, the Commission imposed a 30-day suspension
for the charge of insubordination, but ruled that neither firefighter could return
to work until the appellate process had run its course.90 The appellate court
held that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board's decision that
the firemen had engaged in sexual relations with a woman without her
consent.91
What is interesting is the court's discussion of use-immunity and the
firefighters' refusal to answer any questions having to do with the time period
of midnight to 8:00 a.m. on July 13, 1986 (the shift where the alleged sexual
assault took place). The interrogation was conducted by an investigator hired
by the Department for the purpose of investigating the events that allegedly
transpired on July 13.' Prior to the questioning, the investigator advised
each firefighter of his rights under the Fireman's Disciplinary Act; 93 the
86. 90 Ill. App. 3d 92, 545 N.E.2d 1363 (1989).




91. Id. at 95, 545 N.E.2d at 1366.
92. Id. at 93-94, 545 N.E.2d at 1364.
93. Id. at 94,545 N.E.2d at 1364. The Fireman's Disciplinary Act is found in ILL.
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acting Fire Marshall "ordered each to answer every question truthfully,
correctly, accurately and unevasively."94 Regarding the investigator's first
question about the time period of midnight to 8:00 a.m., the firefighters'
counsel objected and advised that his clients were invoking their constitutional
rights under the fifth amendment and would answer no questions regarding
that time frame. The acting Fire Marshall again ordered the firefighters to
answer the question or face disciplinary action.95 The Board's counsel stated
for the record "that each fireman had refused to answer despite a direct order
to do so and under threat of disciplinary action which would be an exception
to ... [the] right to claim the Fifth Amendment as the statement from here on
out would be inadmissible in court ....,96
Two questions were presented for appeal: 1) whether an employer's
attorney's admonishment that use immunity has attached is sufficient, and 2)
whether the firefighters were adequately informed of the use immunity
doctrine during the interrogation.97 On the first issue the court made it clear
that "no affirmative assurance of immunity from the prosecuting attorney is
required .... 'The employer, it would seem, can do the advising. ' 1a It was
sufficient, reasoned the court, that the grant came from the Board's counsel.
With respect to the second question, the court found that until the
employer advises the employee of use immunity, it cannot rightfully impose
discipline for failing to answer questions pursuant to the employee's fifth-
amendment rights.99 Where questions were asked and answered prior to
plaintiffs invoking their fifth-amendment privileges, and then immunity
granted, from that point on the employer had satisfied the use immunity
requirement. Thus the firefighters' subsequent refusal to answer valid inquiries
regarding their on-duty activities subjected them to disciplinary action, in this
case dismissal.'0°
B. Summary and Analysis
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the privilege against self-
incrimination is related to the question of what safeguards are necessary to
assure that admissions or confessions are relatively trustworthy-that they are
not the product or fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the
REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 2501 (1987).
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truth. The privilege also reflects the limits of the individual's atonement to the
state, and in a philosophical sense, insists upon the equality of the individual
and the state.''
In 1966, in Miranda v. Arizona,' the Supreme Court declared that the
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination "is available outside of
the criminal court proceedings and serves as evidence to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way
... . ,t103 Prior to Miranda, the standard inquiry for the admissibility of
confessions was whether the confession was "voluntary," given the totality of
the circumstances. In Miranda, the Court rejected a case-by-case inquiry into
the voluntariness of an individual's admissions, and instead, created a blanket
presumption that statements obtained from a suspect during custodial
interrogation were compelled, thus requiring their exclusion from evi-
dence.'0 4 What resulted was the famous Miranda warnings requiring that
when a person is taken into custody, "[p]rior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.' 015 The Court also held in Miranda
that a defendant may waive the right to counsel and to remain silent provided
that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."°
The law governing the extent to which a governmental entity may force
its employees to answer questions in the course of an investigation strikes a
balance between the employee's privilege against self-incrimination and the
state's interest in getting an accounting from someone who holds a public
trust. This balance, correctly or incorrectly, has resulted in the following
matrix:
101. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1967) (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n
of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964)).
102. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
103. Id. at 467.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 444. Under the Burger Court the Miranda doctrine had been limited
significantly. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety
exception); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (allowing improperly elicited
statements to be used for impeachment at trial); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971).
106. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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1. What is the State Prohibited from Doing?
A public employer may not fire an employee solely because he is
unwilling to abandon his privilege against self-incrimination." 7 Nor may
an employer use the threat of dismissal to coerce statements from an employee
and then use the statements in a criminal proceeding."' In such a circum-
stance coercion is presumed, and the state bears the burden of showing
voluntariness of the statement. 1 9 As a result, the public-sector employer has
three options: (1) public management can demand an accounting from the
employee on job-related matters but then cannot use these statements in a
criminal prosecution (given, of course, that the employee elects to talk); (2)
the public employer can simply prosecute the employee, in which case an
accounting need not ever be forthcoming; and (3) management can demand
an accounting, grant immunity, and thereby preclude the state's attorney from
prosecuting based on any information supplied by the employee.' The
public employer cannot use any coerced statements in a criminal proceeding
against the employee."' What is settled is that, absent immunity, the
privilege against self-incrimination permits a person not to answer official
questions put forth to him in any proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or
informal, where the answers might incriminate him in a future criminal
proceeding. Therefore, as Blunier demonstrates, the better rule is that until the
employee has an affirmative assurance of immunity (i.e., when the employer
or the state's attorney says the words "you have immunity"), the employee
need not answer possible incriminating questions. Once immunity attaches,
either because it is affirmatively granted by an employer or the state's
107. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Gardner v. Broderick, 392
U.S. 273 (1968).
108. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); People v. Bynum, 159 111. App.
3d 713, 512 N.E.2d 826 (1987).
109. Erwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1985).
110. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 809.
111. Blunier v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs of Peoria, 190 I11. App. 3d. 92,
545 N.E.2d 1363 (1989). The Garrity court outlined with specificity the standards
courts have used in determining whether the accused's statements are voluntary or
coerced. According to Garrity: "the criteria employed have included threats of
imminent danger... physical deprivations... repeated or extended interrogation...
limits on access to counsel or friends.., length and illegality of detention under state
law ... individual weakness or incapacity ... [and] adequacy of warnings of
constitutional rights .... " Garrity, 383 U.S. at 505 (citations omitted). The Court
made it clear that "[w]hatever the criteria employed, the duty of the Court has been 'to
examine the entire record,' and thereby to determine whether the accused's will 'was
overborne by the sustained pressures upon him."' Id. at 505-06 (quoting Davis v. North
Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 (1966)).
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attorney, or because the statements were "coerced," the employee must answer
or face the loss of his job.
2. Who Must Give an Affirmative Assurance of Immunity?
The question of who is the proper person to give the employee immunity
or who has the authority to grant immunity in a particular government
department has not been answered definitively answered by the courts.
Amazingly, in Blunier the appellate court found that the Commission's
counsel was able to grant immunity.12 Equally bizarre, the Blunier court
also stated that no affirmative assurance from the prosecutor is necessary and
that the employer can give immunity." 3 The rationale is that use-immunity
attaches as a matter of law so that the employer's grant of immunity to the
employee is sufficient.114
While it is not clear from the cases what "authority" is necessary to grant
immunity, public policy dictates that, at a minimum, if the courts allow
someone other than the state's attorney to grant immunity, it should be given
only by a supervising or chief official who is not part of the bargaining
unit.115  Therefore, if an employee is informed by a "non-manager" or
person who lacked the authority to give immunity, the employee's statements
can be used against him unless it can be demonstrated they were obtained
under false pretense.
3. What Can Management Do?
As noted, the public employer may ask questions specifically, directly,
and narrowly relating to the performance of the employee's official duties,
even though the answers may tend to incriminate the employee (although
management cannot use those incriminating statements in a subsequent
criminal proceeding, unless they are voluntarily given by the employee).
Public management has an interest in getting an accounting from its
employees. Constitutionally, the employee may be terminated on the basis of
the answer or for refusing to answer. Refusing to answer questions, after
112. Blunier, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 95, 545 N.E.2d at 1366.
113. Id.
114. See Erwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1985) (department chief and
major informed the employee that statements would not be used for criminal
prosecution); D'Acquisto v. Washington, 640 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (state's
attorney for Cook County gave use immunity).
115. We can think of no good reason why the state's attorney should be precluded
from prosecuting because a lower-level, bargaining-unit supervisor in another branch
of government decided to grant immunity.
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being directly ordered to do so and after being advised of use-immunity, is a
serious breach of duty that should not be tolerated by management. A
government agency should not have to rely on the investigation of some
outside authority when the agency's credibility and accountability to the public
is at stake." 6
No case holds that a public employee has an absolute right to keep silent.
The Constitution does not force the state to employ anyone who is accused of
a criminal act and elects to keep quiet. Due process and fairness require only
an opportunity to be heard. If an individual chooses not to take advantage of
that opportunity, due process has been satisfied. The employee simply must
make the choice between his opportunity to be heard and the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Additionally, when the employee is given use immunity, even though his
statements may not be used in a future criminal proceeding against him, the
state is not prohibited from prosecuting the witness on the basis of evidence
derived from other sources."7 Further, the state is never prohibited from
using voluntary statements made by the employee. If public management asks
the employee a question and the employee freely and voluntarily answers, the
statements can be used in a criminal prosecution unless the employee
demonstrates that the statements were coerced.
4. Suggested Format
Some state agencies have adopted a Miranda-type approach to the
problem, outlining with specificity the law in the area and the employee's
rights. Following the suggested format should eliminate any subsequent legal
challenges based on fifth-amendment concerns when an employee is asked to
participate in an investigation. A representative form with relevant declara-
tions is as follows:
Administrative Advisement
Location Advisement Given: Date Time
1. I wish to advise you that you are being questioned as part of an
official investigation of the Police (Fire) Department.
2. You will be asked questions specifically directed and narrowly
related to the performance of your official duties and responsibilities or
fitness for office.
116. Blunier, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 100, 545 N.E.2d at 1372.
117. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
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3. You are entitled to all the rights and privileges guaranteed by the
laws and the constitution of the State of and the Constitution
of the United States, including the right not to be compelled to incriminate
yourself.
4. I further wish to advise you that if you refuse to testify or refuse
to answer questions relating to the performance of your official duties and
responsibilities or fitness for duty, you will be subject to departmental
charges, which could result in dismissal from employment with the City of
Police (Fire) Department.
5. If you do answer, neither your statements nor any information or
evidence which is gained by reason of such statements can be used against
you in any subsequent criminal proceeding. These statements, however,
may be used against you in relation to subsequent departmental charges.
The form should also contain a signed declaration acknowledging that the
administrative advisement has been given, the signatures (if applicable) of the
employee's bargaining representative and the person giving the administrative
advisement. It should also be witnessed and dated by all present."
8
III. ARBITRAL RULINGS
To what extent do arbitrators recognize constitutional privileges both in
the public and private sector? More important, has the Garrity, Gardner, and
Lefkowitz line of reasoning spilled over to public-sector grievance arbitration?
Suppose an employee refuses to answer questions or otherwise cooperate in
an investigation that is clearly unreasonable? What is the remedy for an
employee who refuses to cooperate rather than obey management's directives
and files a grievance at a later time? From a policy perspective, what
considerations should arbitrators take into account when deciding duty-to-
cooperate cases? Does it matter whether the arbitrator is hearing a case in the
public as opposed to the private sector?
A. Asserting Constitutional Arguments in Labor Arbitration"9
In 1967, Robben Fleming observed that in the arbitral setting the
constitutional protection against self-incrimination has little application except
118. We are thankful to Steven Rynecki, Esq., of von Briesen and Purtell,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for making available his file and forms on this matter.
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insofar as it may be a desirable principle in the interest of fair procedure.12
Similarly, Willard Wirtz has argued that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion enters into due process of arbitration, but its relevance is a very special
one. According to Wirtz, there is a clear consensus in the arbitral opinions
that this privilege has no place in the arbitration of grievance cases. Wirtz
asserts that "due process of arbitration" is a distinct concept, similar in its
approach and purposes to "due process of law," but entirely independent in the
conclusion it reaches.2
In Illinois Power Co. v. United Association of Journeymen Plumbers
Local 360,1 a company sought information regarding the grievant's
conduct during work hours while on assignment. The case provided
opportunity for another arbitrator to reason that while the Constitution protects
an accused in criminal proceedings, it does not guarantee that an employee
who invokes the fifth amendment during the investigation of infractions of
company rules and policies will continue to be employed.l" Addressing the
issue of an employee's duty to cooperate, the arbitrator declared that it would
be an act of insubordination subject to discipline or even discharge for an
employee to "refuse to meet with an employer or to cooperate with the
employer regarding legitimate work-related conduct."24  The arbitrator
pointed out that in the instant case, management sought information regarding
the employee's conduct during working hours on company assignment. The
arbitrator correctly recognized that "[w]hile the Constitution protects an
accused in criminal proceedings, it does not guarantee that an employee who
invokes the Fifth Amendment during the investigation of infractions of
Company rules and policies will continue to be employed."
125
Probably the best summary of the application of the fifth amendment to
the employer-employee relationship is given by Arbitrator John McGury in
Simoniz Company.1'2 The grievant was dismissed for failure to cooperate
with the employer in a theft investigation. On advice of counsel, the grievant
120. R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 182 (1965). Larry Schultz,
former FMCS Director of Arbitration Services has remarked: "If an arbitrator is faced
with somebody pleading the Fifth, remind them that arbitration is not a criminal
proceeding." L. Schultz, Procedural Rulings During the Hearing, in ARBITRATION
1982: CONDUCT OF THE HEARING; PROCEEDINGS OF THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBrrRATORS 144-45 (1983).
121. Wirtz, Due Process in Arbitration, The Arbitrator and the Parties, in
PROCEEDINGS OFTHE 11TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONALACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS
19 (1958).
122. 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 586 (1985) (Penfield, Arb.).
123. Id. at 588-89.
124. Id. at 589.
125. Id. at 590.
126. 44 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658 (1964) (McGury, Arb.).
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refused to sign any statements, even a statement denying any guilt or denying
any knowledge of the theft. When the grievant was called as a witness at the
trial of an individual who had been indicted in connection with the thefts, he
took the fifth.
In sustaining the discharge the arbitrator stated that taking the fifth is a
proper and legitimate tactic in criminal courts, "but the company is not
required to pretend that this did not happen and refuse to draw any inferences
from it."127 The arbitrator's reasoning is especially instructive and represents
the better view:
We cannot say, in addition to the guarantee, that the person invoking the
Fifth Amendment has a right to this advantage in a criminal proceeding, and
also has a right to be completely free from any financial, social, or other
possible loss which he may suffer, indirectly, as a result of exercising his
constitutional right .... Employers properly have a higher criteria of
employee qualifications than mere freedom from a criminal conviction.
Employers have a right to absolute honesty, as well as a reasonable amount
of cooperation, from their employees.
The Fifth Amendment does not guarantee that a person who invokes
it will not be subject to any unfavorable inference and does not guarantee
that a person who invokes it shall be continued in employment.128
Finding just cause for dismissal, the arbitrator concluded that the grievant
"took a position which went beyond the need of his own security and
unreasonably infringed upon the right of the Company to make a thorough
investigation of the incident, to the substantial disadvantage of the Compa-
ny. 1
2 9
While it is true that the strict self-incrimination protection offered by the
fifth amendment is not applicable in the absence of government action, it is
nevertheless clear that issues of self-incrimination are often present in labor
arbitration.130 The reported decisions indicate that arbitrators have been
sensitive to constitutional-type concerns in ruling on the effect to be given the
127. Id. at 662.
128. Id. at 663.
129. Id.
130. An especially bizarre case is Delaware River Port Auth. v. Independent
Bridge Workers, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 350 (1981) (Raffaele, Arb.), where a husband
and wife, as testifying witnesses for management, both "took the fifth" and refused to
answer questions involving the provocation of a discharged employee. See also
Anderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 754 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir. 1985)
(rejecting argument that Amtrak, a "mixed ownership government corporation," was
required to provide fifth amendment due process protection to a dismissed employee).
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confession or admissions against interest by the grievant."' This is especial-
ly true in federal-sector arbitration. 32 Arbitrators may not declare that they
are applying constitutional standards, but a close reading of their decisions
indicates a constitutional-type analysis. Some examples are instructive.
In Safeway Stores, Inc.,133 Arbitrator Arthur Jacobs refused to credit a
grievant's signed confession (the confession was obtained during a company
interrogation by security personnel who took turns questioning the grievant in
a small room)."' Arbitrator Jacobs recognized that constitutional safeguards
are designed primarily as a protection against governmental action. Still, the
arbitrator pointed out that "it does not follow that this rationale can be used
to deprive the individual of his constitutional safeguards in all cases." 
1 35
131. See also ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 332-33 (4th ed.
1985); 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 314-18
(2d ed. 1983); R. FLEMING, supra note 120, at 181-86. See generally Indiana Bell Tel.
Co. v. Communication Workers Local 5709, 83 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) para. 8585
at 5573 (1983) (Render, Arb.) (giving effect to grievant's written "confession" and
stating that "[g]rievant's signature [on a written statement] was a concession that he
took items from the store without paying."); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters Local 690, 82 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) para. 8506 at 5262 (1982)
(McGury, Arb.) (crediting grievant's confession made to a polygraph examiner after
failing a polygraph test, noting that "[t]he use of polygraphs for the purpose of
promoting confessions has been found acceptable."); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 2182, 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1195 (1971)
(Jacobs, Arb.) (confession not credited when evidence of mental duress demonstrated);
Thrifty Drug Stores Co., Inc. v. Warehouse, Processing and Distribution Local 26, 50
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1253 (1968) (Jones, Arb.) (statements elicited regarded with
"skepticism" and given weight only when other corroborating evidence present in
situations where interrogations occur without presence of union representation and
discipline likely); Armco Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am. Local 2708, 48
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 132 (1967) (Jones, Arb.) (discharge reversed where confessions
unreliable); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 549
(1965) (Seidenberg, Arb.) (confession not invalidated absent duress and coercion; no
infirmity found where grievant freely admitted use of alcohol to employer representa-
tive who secured grievant's confession and resignation); Kroger Co. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters Local 347, 12 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1065 (1949) (Blair, Arb.) ("confessions"
given to private detective not credited where inducements, commitments, and threats
were made by investigators).
132. See, e.g., United States Dep't of the Treasury v. National Treasury
Employees Union Local 183, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1209, 1214 (1984) (Kaplan, Arb.)
("[t]he rule of law in the federal sector is clear: arbitrators must consider external law,
and the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law.")
133. 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1195 (1971) (Jacobs, Arb.).
134. Id. at 1196.
135. Id. at 1201.
[Vol. 56
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According to Jacobs, constitutional protections against self-incrimination are
broad and "related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that
admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy and are not the result of
fear or coercion; that they are reliable expressions of the truth."'136
In Thrifty Drug Stores Co., 37 Arbitrator Edgar Jones, Jr., applying a
constitutional-type analysis, stated that a trier of fact should proceed with
caution when confessions are introduced. 38 He noted that a consideration
must be "whether the statements are so tainted by compulsions created by the
manner of their taking as to make it too speculative for a trier of fact ... to
give them credence as evidence against those whom they would impli-
cate."139 The case involved the theft of company merchandise. An employee
confessed to his own wrongdoing and further implicated two other employees.
The union, citing Miranda, argued that incriminating statements made by
some of the discharged employees, which were used by the company to
implicate the grievants, ought to be ruled inadmissible, or in any event be
given no weight. Jones pointed out that the "Miranda decision is but one in
a series of Supreme Court affirmations of a fundamental American public
policy that seeks to develop... 'adequate protective devices ... to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings' so that any incriminating
statements obtained 'can truly be the product of free choice. '"1 40 He then
noted that while the industrial setting is different from the legal setting,
important parallels exist. According to Jones, the arbitrator must determine
whether there was truth-telling despite the custodial interrogation. Jones
pointed out that procedures "that impose pressures on interrogated persons to
disclose incriminating facts are unreliable as elicitors of truth and that their
unreliability mounts in direct proportion to the increase in the pressures. ""'
Similarly, Arbitrator Whitley McCoy justified a refusal by an employee
to cooperate with an investigation because it constituted an attempt by the
employer to shift the burden of proof. 42 Citing fifth-amendment concerns,
the arbitrator reasoned that there was no principle, or decided case upholding
management's right to compel an employee, under pain of discharge, to admit
or deny a rule violation or other offense. 143 In McCoy's view, such a
principle would contradict Anglo-American principles, "particularly the one
136. Id.
137. 50 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1253 (1968) (Jones, Arb.).
138. Id. at 1253-54.
139. Id. at 1262.
140. Id. at 1260-61 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966)).
141. Id. at 1261.
142. Exact Weight Scale Co. v. United Automobile Local 969, 50 Lab. Arb.
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that a man is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty, and that the burden
of proof is on the one alleging an offense."' 44
Arbitrators have, with good cause, demonstrated caution before crediting
a grievant's confession, even when taped. 45 Some courts, however, have
sent a message to arbitrators that they should not summarily exclude
incriminating admissions of grievants in considering dismissals under a just-
cause provision. In Young Radiator Co. v. UAW Local 37,'46 the Seventh
Circuit considered the dismissal of an employee for a December 15, 1979 theft
of more than $33,000 of silver solder which was used by the company in its
manufacturing process."47 After the theft was discovered the grievant was
interrogated by the county sheriff's office.148 During that interrogation the
grievant refused to submit to a polygraph examination, but asked if he could
speak "off the record." He then stated that he did not want to take a polygraph
because he had taken a small quantity of silver solder from the company in
the past, and that he was afraid that this would "show up" in a polygraph. 49
The police interrogator later related the grievant's remarks to a company
executive. 50
The arbitrator found that the company had not proven that the grievant
was responsible for the later theft,' 5 ' and accordingly, this could not be the
basis for the dismissal. The arbitrator also found that the grievant's admission
concerning his earlier taking of silver solder did not constitute just cause. He
reasoned that this was not the "motivating cause" for the discharge. The lower
court upheld the award and the court of appeals reversed. 52
In holding for the company, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the
parties' agreement gave the employer the right to discharge an employee for
theft. In the words of the court,
144. Id.
145. Associated Grocers of Colo., Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local
435, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 974 (1983) (Smith, Arb.) (reversing discharge of employee
who had made taped admission to undercover agent that he had smoked marijuana,
concluding that admissions were "put on").
146. 734 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1984).
147. Id. at 321-22.
148. Id. at 322.
149. Id
150. Id. at 321-22.
151. Id. at 322 n.2.
152. The award was remanded to the arbitrator in order to determine whether
"[the grievant's] statement that in the past he had taken a small quantity of silver
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[n]othing in the collective bargaining agreement indicates that such a
discharge should be permitted only if an earlier theft is the motivating cause
for the discharge; this notion was introduced by the arbitrator himself. In
so doing the arbitrator failed to confine himself to the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.
Likewise, in Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service,"
an arbitrator held that questioning of a grievant by postal inspectors for one
and one-quarter hours before reading him his Miranda rights violated his
privilege against self-incrimination and rendered his subsequent statement
(made after Miranda warnings were issued) inadmissible at the arbitration
hearing. 55 Because the grievant's statements formed the basis of the Postal
Service's charges, the removal action was not sustained. On appeal, a federal
court reversed the award. 56 According to the court, the issue was "whether
the failure of the warnings under Miranda to [grievant] prior to making such
a statement of admission renders such a statement inadmissible as a require-
ment in any provision of the collective bargaining agreement." 57 Finding
that there was no Miranda requirement contemplated in the labor agreement,
the court concluded that the award did not "draw its essence" from the
collective bargaining agreement and that "the arbitrator exceeded his authority
by implementing the requirements of Miranda in his arbitration award."'5 8
A recurring issue is whether in the public sector an employee has any
rights under the fifth amendment vis-a-vis his employer. Illustrative is
Hamilton v. Waukesha County Area Vocational, Technical and Adult
Education District'59 where plaintiff-teachers argued that their constitutional
153. Id. at 324.
154. 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2472 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd, 789 F.2d 1, 122 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2094 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
155. In the words of the arbitrator:
I consider the following factors significant in any determination dealing
with the questioning of this Grievant. He was an acknowledged suspect.
He was questioned for at least one and one-quarter hours before his rights
were explained. The testimony covering that time frame is sketchy at best.
The Grievant was isolated from all outside contact. Coupled with the
evidence and this environment, I find that the questioning for one and one-
quarter hours before reading the Grievant his Miranda rights in effect
undermined the Grievant's privilege against self-incrimination and was
'custodial interrogation.'
Postal Workers, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2473.
156. Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 1.
157. Id. at 2473.
158. Id. at 2474.
159. 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3197 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
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rights were violated because incriminating statements taken by the police in
an investigation were used against them in a dismissal hearing. In the case
plaintiffs, both public and private-sector employees, were apprehended and
subsequently discharged for having used marijuana at the workplace. The
federal court rejected the argument that "a corollary to the exclusionary rule
applied in criminal cases operates with identical effect in the context of public
employment."'" Instead the court drew a distinction between the liberty
interest at stake in the criminal context and the property interest at stake in a
public employment context. The Miranda safeguard, said the court, "operates
as a procedural device to protect a criminal suspect's right against compulsory
self-incrimination," while the dismissal of these employees simply implicates
a property interest: "[t]he omission of Miranda warnings does not implicate
their liberty interests, because no one is trying to put them in jail."' The
court found no infirmity in using the employees' statements:
With reference to specific procedural safeguards claimed here, a reading of
Miranda ... discloses that the primary purposes of the requirement of
Miranda warnings are to ensure that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is preserved, and to ensure that a suspect is aware of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Can an incriminating statement taken
from a public employee who is not first advised of these rights be the basis
for a discharge? The answer is "yes." To answer otherwise would revolu-
tionize relations between public employers and their employees.'
62
In Chisolm v. United States Postal Service,'63 an employee was fired
from his position for removing property without authorization. 16 The
appellant-employee contended that the postal inspectors never advised him
during custodial interrogation that his oral statements could be used against
him; therefore, his constitutional right to counsel at the time of the interview
was violated under the Court's Miranda holding.' 65 The employee accord-
ingly requested that the Memoranda of Interview generated by the inspectors
be excluded.'6 The Merit System Protection Board ("MSPB") pointed out
that the presiding official found that while a motion to suppress evidence can
properly be made in a criminal proceeding, it is inapplicable to a removal
action before the MSPB. 67 The officer ruled that the Sixth Amendment
160. Id. at 3199.
161. Id. at 3201.
162. Id.
163. 7 M.S.P.B. 42 (1981).
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requirement of warning of the right to counsel has not been extended in all
instances of governmental questioning, but only to those that have become
criminal in nature. The MSPB stated that because it was not finding a
violation of Miranda, it would not decide whether evidence obtained in
violation of Miranda must be excluded in Board proceedings. The Board did
note, however, that "an employee does not have a Miranda right to counsel
in an agency investigative interview unless (1) the investigation may result in
criminal prosecution; and (2) the interrogation takes place while the employee
is in custody."'16
In Charter Township of Canton,169 an employer chose to rely only on
a police investigation in establishing just cause. Arbitrator William Daniel held
that a municipal employer had no basis for suspending or terminating an
employee suspected of theft once it became apparent that criminal charges
against the employee were going to be dropped because the grievant was not
informed of his Miranda rights when giving a confession to police. The
arbitrator reasoned that haying "chosen to establish the police department as
its agent for the purpose of investigating and collecting the facts pertinent to
this grievant, it [management] may not accept the benefits without the
obligations and limitations which are established by law.' 170
B. Federal-Sector Notices to Admit
At the federal level "notices to admit" are sometimes issued by agencies
in investigations of employee wrongdoing. Essentially, these notices require
that the grievant supply the agency with information relating to the grievance.
Arbitrator David Kaplan in United States Department of Treasury7' ruled
168. Id. See also Long v. Veterans Admin., 10 M.S.P.B. 772 (1982) (sustaining
removal of housekeeping aide for bringing handgun with loaded clip into VA Medical
Center against claim that employee should have been read Miranda rights before being
asked whether he owned jacket where handgun was found; at time VA police asked
grievant if coat belonged to him, appellant was not in the custody of police, and once
appellant responded that coat belonged to him, he was advised of his Miranda rights);
Book v. United States Postal Serv.,*6 M.S.P.B. 322 (1981), affd, 675 F.2d 158 (8th
Cir. 1982) (concluding that the fifth amendment does not preclude official from
drawing adverse inferences when employee refuses to testify at administrative hearing
in response to probative evidence offered against him or her); Wilkens v. Veterans
Admin., 6 M.S.P.B. 611 (1981) (rejecting argument that agency violated Miranda
rights of employee during investigation where individual taking statement of employee
was agency investigator with no authority to take employee under custody or arrest
him).
169. 81 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) para. 8081 at 3358 (1980) (Daniel, Arb.).
170. Id. at 3360.
171. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1209 (1984) (Kaplin, Arb.).
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that such requests to admit or confess were improper in the private sector, "but
certainly more so in the federal sector."" Kaplan first noted that the
employer has the burden of proof in a disciplinary case, and he may not shift
that burden to the employee by requesting a confession. Secondly, he pointed
out that labor relations in the federal sector are protected by due process
safeguards as well as constitutional guarantees. Arbitrator Kaplan explained
that a federal-sector employee "may decline to respond to a Notice to Admit
or to any interrogatories if that employee has a reasonable basis for believing
that such information may form a link in a chain of evidence that may result
in criminal penalties."' 73
C. Summary and Analysis
What rules or principles do arbitrators follow when employees assert
fifth-amendment type arguments in an arbitration proceeding? When
management offers the grievant's statements or testimony at an arbitration
hearing, the weight to be accorded the grievant's confession or other self-
incriminating statement will be assessed in the light of all the conditions under
which it was obtained. When it can be demonstrated that a confession has
been made out of fear or coercion, and is thus not a reliable expression of
truth, an arbitrator can be expected to give it little weight. This is true
particularly where the employer offers little or no evidence other than the
confession. As stated by the West Coast Tripartite Committee, "[i]nterroga-
tion of employees is a normal and vital prerogative of an employer." 1
74
While it is to be favored, the committee nevertheless noted that "the concern
of the arbitrator at the proffer of evidence of 'confessions'. . . will be for its
reliability, and in egregious situations, for its allowability in terms of fair play
and reasonable privacy." 75 The Committee concluded as follows:
Emotional strain at accusation and the latent fear of the power of an
employer to cause criminal prosecution irrespective of guilt or innocence,
render this kind of evidence unreliable, and unless it is demonstrated that
reasonable safeguards were observed in the investigation, including the real
opportunity for representation, evidence of employee admissions during
interrogation should be deemed inadmissible. 76
172. Id. at 1213.
173. Id. at 1213 n.6.
174. REPORT OF THE WEST COAST TRIPARTITE COMMITEE, PROBLEMS OF PROOF
IN ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY
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Suppose the grievant refuses to cooperate and remains silent at all times?
Although the fifth-amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not
applicable in a non-governmental setting,177 some arbitrators, while recogniz-
ing the non-applicability of the Constitution in labor arbitration, will
nevertheless consider the due process standards that are traditionally applied
in the criminal law setting. This is especially true where the alleged
misconduct carries the stigma of general social disapproval. Few arbitrators,
however, will recognize that an employee has the right to remain silent when
management demonstrates a need for information and the misconduct is
subject to a published rule.
King Co.'78 is a private-sector case illustrating the interaction among
a citizen's right to be protected by the fifth amendment, his right to some kind
of industrial due process from his employer, and the employee's duty to
cooperate in an investigation of misconduct. The decision is reported by
Arbitrator Joseph Baird. In King, management asserted that four employees
vandalized a vehicle of a fellow employee and the vandalization was related
to incidents that occurred at the workplace. The employees were dismissed.
The company argued that the dismissals should be sustained because three of
the four grievants lied to the employer during the investigation of the incident.
Arbitrator Baird found that the application of the work rule against "lying to
an employer" was impermissible in this context. He reasoned that, in effect,
management sought to compel the grievants to implicate themselves in a
criminal action before the matter came to court (all four grievants were
charged with criminal damage to property). Arbitrator Baird found that the
confession of one of the grievants played a critical part in their arrest and
conviction, and that "there can be little doubt that the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution creates a privilege against self-incrimination which is available
outside of the criminal court proceedings ... 7 With regard to when an
employee had a duty to cooperate in an investigation, Arbitrator Baird stated
the rule this way:
177. In some jurisdictions testimonial privileges may be operative in a private-
sector arbitration proceeding. For example, Arbitrator Cheter Brisco commented:
While the arbitration statute in California declares that the rules of evidence
do not apply, it is stated elsewhere that privileges apply to all hearings. An
arbitration is defined as a hearing. Therefore, if a privilege against self-
incrimination is asserted in an arbitration, the arbitrator should sustain the
privilege.
PROCEDURAL RULINGS DURING THE HEARING, ARBITRATION 1982: CONDUCT OF THE
HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBrrRATORS 138, 145 (1983) [hereinafter PROCEDURAL RULINGS].
178. 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 681 (1987) (Baird, Arb.).
179. Id. at 685.
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While it is inappropriate for an employee to lie to an employer about a
matter related to the conduct of his job, he ought not to be punished by his
employer for failing to cooperate in an investigation which could lead to his
incarceration, particularly one concerning an incident which did not occur
at work.180
Arbitrator Baird correctly points out that any investigation management
makes should be related directly to an employee's specific job. Difficult
questions arise, however, when the matter under investigation involves an
employee's present fitness for work because of off-duty considerations.
In general, arbitrators are reluctant to sustain discipline or discharge
based on off-duty misconduct (i.e., conduct that occurs off the premises during
non-working time) absent some relationship or "nexus" to the job. The reason
for this principle was well expressed by Arbitrator Clair Duff twenty-five
years ago in his often-cited Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.181 decision. There
Arbitrator Duff sustained the dismissal of a welder with 16 years' seniority
who pleaded guilty to a narcotics offense: attempting to twice obtain cocaine
by misrepresenting a physician's prescription obtained by another person.
Duff warned that arbitrators should be reluctant to sustain discharges for off-
duty conduct "lest Employers become censors of community morals." 182 He
nevertheless agreed that "where socially reprehensible conduct and employ-
ment duties and risks are closely related, conviction for certain types of crimes
may justify discharge.' 83
It is of note that Mr. Duff, quoting with approval the company's answer
in the lower steps of the grievance procedure, recognized "reputation" and the
morale of fellow employees as legitimate company considerations. According
to Arbitrator Duff, management "is not obligated to continue in its employ
employees who commit offenses involving moral turpitude especially where
a conviction is involved."'' 4
Likewise, in Fairmont General Hospital,'85 Arbitrator Alfred Dybeck
considered the discharge of a hospital maid for shoplifting at a local
department store. 8 6 Because the hospital had experienced a recent problem
of theft, and even though the maid was not accused of stealing from the
hospital, the arbitrator upheld discharge because her actions created serious
180. Id. (emphasis in original).
181. 38 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 891 (1961) (Duff, Arb.).
182. Id. at 891-892.
183. Id. at 893.
184. Id.
185. 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1293 (1972) (Dybeck, Arb.).
186. Id. at 1293-94.
[Vol. 56
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doubt as to her trustworthiness as an employee. 7 , Arbitrator Dybeck
outlined the controlling principle in off-duty conduct cases as follows:
While generally an employee's conduct away from the place of business is
normally viewed as none of the employer's business, there is a significant
exception where it is established than an employee's misconduct off the
premises can have a detrimental effect on the employer's reputation or
product, or where the off-duty conduct leads to a refusal, reluctance or
inability of other employees to work with the employee involved.'88
Arbitrator Harvey Nathan, in a decision involving a discharge of a
firefighter for off-duty misconduct, expressed the principle adopted by most
arbitrators in off-duty conduct cases this way:
[IThe generally accepted standard among arbitrators is that proof of off-duty
misconduct, even when serious and/or criminal, does not justify automatic
discharge. An employer must show that the conduct has a demonstrable
effect on the employer's business. In this regard, saying it does not make
it so. An employer must do more than simply make the pronouncement
that it has or wili be injured by retaining an employee who has engaged in
off-duty misconduct.
189
Arbitrator Nathan concluded that the particular crime involved, theft and
possession of stolen property, "renders the grievant particularly unsuited for
fire fighting."' 90
Marvin Hill and Mark L. Kahn, in an address before the National
Academy of Arbitrators, have summarized most of the criteria arbitrators
apply in off-duty cases as follows:
Whether the nexus is sufficient to overcome the presumption that an
employee's off-duty behavior is not subject to the employer's control is, as
we have seen, dependent on many considerations. The characteristics of the
employer may be critical. If it is claimed that the off-duty misconduct had
adversely affected or will harm the company's reputation or sales, or both,
this may be of greater concern for firms that operate in highly competitive,
consumer-oriented markets (e.g., airlines, retail stores, private schools,
health clubs, day-care centers) than for oligopolistic firms with produced-
oriented markets.
The location of the employer may be a factor. A prominent employer
in a small.isolated town may be legitimately more sensitive to scandal
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1295.
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based on off-duty misconduct than an anonymous employer in a large
metropolitan area.
The nature of the misconduct: Violent, destructive, or perverted
actions may reinforce the nexus more than crimes of the so-called white-
collar variety (e.g. tax evasion). A misdemeanor (e.g., marijuana posses-
sion) is much less likely to be considered just cause for discharge than a
felony (e.g., marijuana sales).
The occupation of the offender. Many decisions [in the off-duty area]
have hinged on a link between the employee's job duties and obligations
and the content of the misconduct. It is not hard to demonstrate a nexus
when a police officer commits a felony off-duty, when a teacher molests a
child off-duty, when a sales clerk is convicted of shoplifting (from someone
else's store), or when a bank teller has embezzled funds from his church's
treasury. The extent and nature of the grievant's customer contacts are
important, especially if they relate to the type of misconduct. Committers
of sex crimes or property thefts will probably not be retained in jobs that
entail entering customers' homes.
Finally, there is the extent and kind of publicity. When the public's
attention has focused on the misconduct and the miscreant has been clearly
identified with the employer, the nexus is reinforced. Often, of course, it
is the publicity that caused the employer to become aware of the off-duty
misconduct.' 9'
The important consideration is that if management's internal investigation
concerns conduct away from the workplace on the employee's own time, it
may have difficulty sustaining the dismissal of an employee for failure to
cooperate if the employer cannot establish a direct nexus or relationship
between the employee's job and the off-duty conduct. Alleging that a nexus
exists will not make it so. Most arbitrators require that management
demonstrate by hard evidence the impact that the employee's conduct has on
the employer's business. As Arbitrator Arthur Ross observed, the answer as
to whether there is a nexus will not be found by "comparing the intrinsic
culpability of different grievants."' 9'
191. M. HILL & M. KAHN, Discipline and Discharge for Off-Duty Misconduct:
What are the Arbitral Standards, in ARBITRATION 1986: CURRENT AND EXPANDING
ROLES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 39TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 121-54 (1986).
192. Id. at 154. (citing A. Ross, Discussion, The Criminal Law and Industrial
Discipline Labor Arbitration-Perspectives and Problems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
17TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (1964)).
[Vol. 56
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D. Related Issues Confronting Arbitrators and Advocates
1. What Constitutes a Refusal to Cooperate in an Investigation?
An employee who declares that he is not answering any questions, or
refuses to even show up for the investigation, 93 clearly is refusing to
cooperate and can be dealt with accordingly. The reasoning would also apply
to an employee that refuses to execute a written statement indicating what he
knows about a specific incident. 94 Refusals to cooperate may take addition-
al forms, some of which are beyond management's jurisdiction to assess
discipline. Common examples include employees who refuse drug or
polygraph tests' 95 and employees who refuse management access to their
personal lockers or cars. 96 Other cases arise when a union steward has
information that management desires, but for whatever reason, the steward
refuses to disclose.
197
Should it matter whether the employee has been directed by outside
counsel to keep quiet? Most, but not all, arbitrators will find little sympathy
for an employee who asserts that he cannot talk to his employer about an
193. AT & T Communications, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1229 (1990) (Kaufman,
Arb.) (refusing to meet with management to discuss warnings).
194. City of Highland Park, 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1089 (1990) (Daniel, Arb.)
(failure to submit report in timely manner and failure to attend meeting).
195. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Kroger Co., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 251, 253 (1968) (Schieb, Arb.).
197. Loomis Armored Inc., 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1097 (1990) (Gentile, Arb.). In
Loomis, Arbitrator Joseph Gentile ruled that just cause existed to discipline a union
steward who refused to disclose to an armored car company the names of employees
whom he interviewed during his investigation of the disappearance of a bag containing
approximately $31,500. The employer characterized the Grievant's action as "failure
to cooperate." Id. at 1100. The union argued that the information was "privileged"
as the Grievant was acting as a union steward. Although the arbitrator found that the
investigation was accomplished within the ambit of his union steward duties, he
nevertheless ruled that there was no privilege under this evidence record. According
to Arbitrator Gentile, the instant situation did not involve communication between a
steward and a grievant, but between the Grievant steward and persons interviewed
during his investigation on behalf of an employee who had made an inquiry and was
not a grievant at the time. Id. at 1101. Arbitrator Gentile reasoned as follows:
What was highly persuasive in reaching this conclusion was the nature of
the employer's business, the importance of the employer's investigation and
the absence of a "Grievant-union" situation which would create this type of
a "privilege," if such a "privilege" should be extended at all.
Id. It is of note that although the arbitrator sustained the discipline, he did rule that
a three-day suspension should be reduced to a written warning.
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event specifically related to his job because his attorney has advised him that
he should keep quiet in light of anticipated or concurrent criminal proceed-
ings.1
9 8
2. Refusal to Testify and Arbitral Inferences
What inference should an arbitrator make when an employee comes to
the hearing but refuses to testify? Not infrequently in arbitrations involving
theft the grievant will have a case pending in criminal court for the same theft.
Should it make a difference whether the grievant refuses to testify because
there is a pending proceeding in another forum?
Advocates frequently choose not to call the grievant to testify. Indeed,
in some cases the grievant may not even be present at the hearing. This
strategy presents questions of the inferences that may be drawn from the
grievant's refusal to testify when the other side has put into evidence facts
adverse to the grievant. Assume that the grievant is fired for theft, and at the
hearing a management witness (otherwise credible) testifies that he saw the
grievant take company property and place it in his car. If the grievant does
not take the stand and deny that he took the property, chances are good that
the arbitrator will hold that the facts as alleged by the witness are true. The
grievant need not testify at the hearing (or even be present for that matter);
some arbitrators give routine lip-service to the notion that no adverse inference
will be drawn, but it is clear that a fact can be resolved against the grievant
if he "sits back" while allegations of fact are made. The advocate may
attempt to convince the arbitrator that important considerations mandate not
taking the stand (such as a pending criminal trial), but the arbitrator is unlikely
to be moved.
An explanatory note is in order. Consistent with the Supreme Court's
holding in Griffin v. California,'" that the accused has a constitutional right
not to testify and no adverse inference can be drawn from this failure, some
arbitrators have gone on record stating that they will not draw any inferences
from a refusal to testify. Thus, Arbitrator John Sembower, in American
International Aluminum Corp.,2°° has declared that he "disregards any
adverse inference~s which might be drawn from the Grievant's not being
present at the hearing.',20 1 While noting that an arbitration is not a criminal
matter, he nevertheless reasoned that "there is an inescapable analogy between
198. See, e.g., Marigold Foods, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 751, 754 (1990) (Bognanno,
Arb.) (where the arbitrator sustained the dismissal of employee for refusing to submit
to a drug test, rejecting grievant's argument that he did so on advice of counsel).
199. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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the absence from an arbitration hearing of the Grievant in a disciplinary case
and the rule of law that a defendant in court may not be required to take the
stand if he chooses not to do so.''2°2 Accordingly, the grievant's refusal to
testify should not be held against him.
An examination of arbitral opinions indicates that arbitrators do in fact
draw inferences from the grievant's failure to testify, although it is sometimes
unclear just how the inference may operate. Neutrals have recognized that
there are many reasons why a grievant might not testify, including the fact
that some persons make poor witnesses because of their demeanor, their
inability to respond to direct questions, and their tendency to become rattled.
Advocates in both the judicial and arbitral forums will keep a witness off the
stand "not because he is dishonest, but because he is bumbling, inarticulate,
unintelligent, or easily confused or confounded, one in whose mouth the truth
may indeed lie, but never to be dislodged. " 3 For these reasons arbitrators
have not assumed that the most logical inference to be drawn from a
grievant's failure to testify is that he would only give testimony damaging to
his cause. The more-reasoned position mandates that before any negative
inferences are to be drawn from a failure to testify, the employer must
establish a prima facie case. 2°4 Once that task is satisfied, however, an
arbitrator may well resolve an uncontested fact against the grievant. Although
an arbitrator may not assert that he is finding for the employer on a specific
issue because the grievant (or, for that matter, some other witness) did not
contest the facts as alleged by management, still it is not unexpected that the
employee's case is necessarily weakened when an important witness fails to
challenge otherwise damaging evidence.
Advocates are advised to never let a fact that is being contested go
uncontested. If alleged facts adverse to the employee-grievant are not
contested (in some manner, either by the grievant himself or some other
202. Id. at 5045.
203. PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN THE ARBITRATION PROCESS: REPORT OF THE WEST
COAST TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE, in PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN ARBITRATION: PROC. OF
THE 19TH ANN. MEETING OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 149, 201 (1967).
204. The distinguished and late Arbitrator Peter Seitz articulated the better
position as follows:
I don't use adverse inferences. I decide the case on the evidence that is
before me. If people refuse to testify, including grievants, there is simply
no testimony against them. If the employer's evidence justifies a dis-
charge-shows there is just cause for a discharge-I will uphold a
discharge ....
PROCEDURAL RULINGS, supra note 177, at 145.
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witness), the award may issue where the arbitrator declares something to the
effect that, "the company witness alleged and Grievant did not deny .... 11205
With respect to the special situation where the grievant has a criminal
case pending, while it may be understandable why he would refuse to testify,
the better arbitrators will decide the case based on the evidence before them.
If management's evidence shows there is just cause for a discharge, it will be
upheld notwithstanding grievant's reasons for not taking the stand. Many
arbitrators will not order the grievant to testify, but this does not mean that
uncontested facts will be resolved as if the grievant denied them under oath.
The arbitrator may talk about and even sustain the privilege but neverthe-
less draw an adverse inference against the grievant.
3. Assistance of Counsel
Suppose the employee asks to have counsel present at the investigation
in addition to his union representative? Some employees not only ask to have
an attorney present, but request that management produce eyewitnesses so that
their attorney can proceed to cross-examine the witnesses prior to the
arbitration hearing.
Arbitration procedures rarely call for pre-hearing discovery and the
exchange of witness lists and cross-examination of witnesses prior to hearing
unless (1) these pre-hearing procedures have been specifically instituted for
the case; or (2) a provision mandating discovery is found in the collective
bargaining agreement. And with good reason. The essence of arbitration is
to avoid the procedural complexities that make litigation comparatively slow
and costly. As pointed out by Judge Learned Hand, arbitration may or may
not be a desirable substitute for trials in courts, but that is for the parties to
decide in each instance. Once the parties adopt a grievance-arbitration
provision, they must be content with its informalities and not hedge about with
205. See, e.g., American Steel Foundries (Indiana Harbor Works), 94 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 745, 747 (1990) (Seidman, Arb.) (Arbitrator declared that "the Constitutional
safeguards supporting the 'presumption of innocence' are not applicable in an arbitral
forum. The Grievant can be called as a witness by the Company and compelled to
give testimony against himself. His failure to be called by the Union can be utilized
against him by the finder of fact."); see also City of San Antonio, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
159, 162 (1987) (Williams, Arb.) (Compelling police officer to testify at his arbitration
hearing does not violate privilege against self incrimination, reasoning that "privilege
against self-incrimination is largely related to admissions or confessions in a criminal
setting .... Thus, the primary application of self-incrimination in arbitration, if any
at all, relates to an interest in fair procedure.").
206. Some arbitrators would even warn the grievant to get a lawyer because if he
starts answering questions regarding a theft where a criminal case is pending, he may
waive his privilege. PRocEDuRAL RULINGS, supra note 177, at 145.
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those procedural limitations which it is precisely its purpose to avoid.2°7 If
the purpose of arbitration is to avoid the cost and delay of the judicial process,
and at the same time, serve as a substitute for a strike, the better rule, absent
a specific provision in the parties' labor agreement, is not to encumber
arbitration with all the formalities of a court trial.
As far as counsel's presence, private-sector arbitration is a private
proceeding conducted under the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
Absent a provision in the labor agreement, a grievant-employee has no right
to have outside counsel present at the hearing, although under NLRB v. J.
Weingarten,2  an employee does have the right to have a union representa-
tive present at an investigatory meeting where discipline is a possibility.209
We submit that the same rule applies in the public sector.210
4. Existence of Rules or Regulations
Does management need a specific rule or regulation requiring that
employees cooperate in investigations before an employee can be disciplined
for failure to cooperate? Few arbitrators or courts would hold that management
would be precluded from interviewing its employees in cases involving a bona
fide need for information because no plant rule provided management with
this right. Management does not look to the parties' collective bargaining
agreement or to its rules and regulations to determine what it can do by way
of obtaining information from employees. Absent a provision to the contrary
(we doubt that there is such a collective bargaining agreement in existence),
management can require that employees fully participate in internal investiga-
tions even when the parties' collective bargaining agreement is silent on the
issue.
Before sustaining discipline or discharge for insubordination, however,
arbitrators have required that management's order be clear and that the
207. American Almond Prod. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448,
451 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J.).
208. 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975) (Holding that employee is entitled to union
representation during investigatory phase of disciplinary interview where (1) employee
"reasonably believes the investigation will result in disciplinary action," and (2) "where
the employee requests representation."). See generally M. HILL & A. SINICROPI,
REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 255-57 (1991).
209. For an excellent discussion involving third-party participation in an
arbitration proceeding, see PROcEDURAL RULINGs, supra note 177, at 145.
210. In the federal sector, Congress has codified employees' Weingarten rights
in 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B) (1988), and agencies are annually required to inform
employees of their Weingarten rights.
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employee be told exactly what the penalty is for disobeying the order.211
An employer who requires employees to fully cooperate in an investigation
need do no more than state what is expected of the employee, that is, tell what
he knows (in the language of perception, the so-called "verbs") or face
dismissal. An employer who fails either task risks having discipline
overturned by an arbitrator.
A different rule, however, may apply when management's investigation
requires an employee to submit to a drug or polygraph test.
5. Special Applications: Drug and Polygraph Tests
Can an employee be disciplined for failure to participate or cooperate in
an investigation where the company's "investigation" requires that the
employee submit to a drug or polygraph test?
a. Refusals to Submit to Drug Tests
As pointed out by one arbitrator, "arbitration precedent dealing with drug
testing is not yet a coherent body of doctrine. Most cases turn on the
particular facts presented to the arbitrator, and precedent is thus of limited
value., 212 Still, where management has a rule or policy providing for testing
and employees have been so notified, most arbitrators, tracking constitutional
law,2 3 hold that when there is a reasonable basis to test, management can
211. A. KOVEN & S. SMITH, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS 69 (1985) states the
following:
[N]otice is still at the heart of many insubordination cases. If an employee
is to be disciplined (and especially discharged) for disobeying a supervisor's
order, the order itself must meet two fundamental criteria with respect to
notice: First, the order must be clear and specific enough to let the
employee know exactly what is expected of him. Second, the employee
must be told exactly what the penalty will be for refusing to comply.
See also M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 506-07 (1986) (footnote
omitted) which states the following:
[T]hree requirements must be satisfied before arbitrators uphold a discharge
for insubordination: (1) the company must demonstrate that the instructions
were clear and that the grievant understood the directives; (2) the instruc-
tions must be understood to be an order, not just a request; and (3) the
individual must understand the penalty that may be imposed for being
insubordinate. Even when the three requirements are satisfied, the grievant's
work record and length of service may still operate to reduce the penalty
imposed by management.
212. Regional Transp. Dist., 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 117,123 (1989) (Mogler, Axb.).
213. The taking of blood constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of
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effect the termination of an employee for insubordination when the employee
refuses the drug test.214 In this regard Hill & Sinicropi conclude that
[M]ost arbitrators will uphold discipline or even dismissal when an
employee refuses to take an examination so long as management can
establish a reasonable basis in fact (probable cause in the public sector) for
believing that the employee was under the influence. Alternatively, when
a test is refused, an arbitrator may simply conclude that the employee was
under the influence and not bother to rule on the question of whether
discipline was proper for refusing the examination. Whichever alternative
is chosen, the end result is the same. The suspected drug user is disciplined
or terminated from employment.215
the fourth amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766 (1966). Similarly,
the taking of a urine sample is a search and seizure under the fourth amendment.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). Drug testing
by a private employer does not constitute state action, subject to the fourth amendment,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974), unless a close nexus exists
between the government and the employer. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding railroad drug testing required by
Federal Railway Administration constitutes governmental action subject to fourth
amendment). Random testing by a public employer is prohibited absent probable cause
or, in most cases, reasonable suspicion that an employee is under the influence or
impaired. Serpas v. Schmidt, 808 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1986) (random search of race
track personnel unconstitutional). See also Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (periodic testing as part of physical exam unconstitutional absent on-the-job
impairment); Patchoque-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d
57, 510 N.E.2d 325 (1987) (school board prohibited from performing drug screens as
condition of teacher being considered for tenure, absent reasonable suspicion based on
supportable objective facts and pursuant to established administrative standards).
In certain professions, random drug testing has passed constitutional muster. See
Transport Workers' Union of Philadelphia, Local 234 v. Southwestern Penn. Transp.
Auth., 517 F.2d 456 (3d Cir. 1988) (employees in safety sensitive jobs); Policeman's
Benevolent Ass'n, Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988)
(police officers); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.
1988) (high school athletes); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th
Cir. 1988) (engineers at nuclear power plant); McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302
(8th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
986 (1986) (jockeys, prison guards).
214. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp., 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 632 (1990) (Blum, Arb.)
(sustaining discharge for refusing to provide more than one urine sample); Linde Gases
of the Midwest, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 225 (1989) (Nielson, Arb.) (refusing to submit
to alcohol screen).
215. M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 208, at 189. See also Flannery,
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Another source states the rule followed by the arbitral community this way:
It is a basic principle of industrial relations that an employee must "obey
now, grieve later;" he has few justifications to refuse an order. He is
insubordinate if he refuses to comply with a legitimate work order that does
not raise a bona fide fear for his safety or a bona fide belief that his
contractual rights will be violated if he obeys the order. Under the latter
exception, where no rule or policy provides for drug testing, or employees
have not been notified of the policy or that they will be fired for refusing
to take the test, arbitrators will reinstate employees discharged for refusing
to take the test. If the policy is clearly in place and employees are notified
of the consequences of refusal to submit to drug tests, some evidence that
the order to submit was based on a desire to harass, or other arbitrary or
capricious conduct, may mitigate the consequences of an insubordinate
refusal to submit. Many arbitrators, however, will find that insubordination
is inexcusable where employees know of a rule, and that the employee's
proper course of action is to give a sample and grieve afterward for a
remedy.21
6
Suppose management's rule is unreasonable, such as when an employer
promulgates a rule requiring any employee returning from a leave of absence
to submit to a drug test?217 Arbitrators disagree on the proper remedy for
employees discharged for refusing to submit to a drug tests that were
improperly required. Some arbitrators have held that where management
makes an unreasonable request for a drug test, a discharge arising from an
employee's refusal to submit is not reasonable. 8 One solution is to
reinstate the employee to his former position, but without backpay on the
ground that he failed to mitigate damages by refusing to comply with the
order and subsequently filing a grievance.219 Arbitrator Winograd, however
stated that
There is an equitable unattractiveness to such a remedy. Undoubtedly, an
employee who was not involved in drug usage could have avoided
discharge by allowing the employer to confirm that fact through a drug test.
An employee who would have failed a drug test had he submitted to it may
216. R. DECREsE, DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 194-95 (1990).
217. See, e.g., Day & Zimmermann, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 399 (1990) (Nicholas,
Arb.) (holding testing of employees returning from leaves of absence unreasonable as
impermissible attempt to control off-duty conduct).
218. Pacific Gas & Elect., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 194 (1988) (Koven, Arb.);
Fruehauf Corp., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 366 (1986) (Nathan, Arb.); Gulf Atl. Dist. Serv.,
88 Lab. Arb. 475 (1985) (Williams, Arb.).
219. Arbitrators have held that employees have an affirmative duty to mitigate
damages. See M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 173, at 214-23.
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have salvaged his employment by refusing to take the test, but he should
not be rewarded for having "dodged a bullet."2
0
Arbitrator Winograd concluded that application of the "obey now, grieve later"
principle would render an employee's expectation of privacy meaningless
because the employee cannot undo that invasion by successfully prosecuting
a grievance."' He accordingly reinstated the employee with full backpay
and benefits (less any interim earnings and unemployment compensation).
In another decision, Arbitrator Richard Canner stated that an employee
need not cooperate in an investigation regarding misconduct (in this case,
competition with the employer's business) where management has not
established a clear rule against the conduct it wishes to prohibit.222 The
arbitrator's reasoning is noteworthy:
The Company argues that grievant's refusal to answer [management's]
questions relative to the type of business he was engaged in was insubordi-
nation. Grievant refused to answer these questions, stating that he first
wanted to consult with his attorney. However, to the date of the arbitration
hearing, grievant never volunteered any response to these questions.
I am of the view that, where an employee violates a clear work-related
rule, he has a duty to cooperate with the employer to the extent of
answering questions relative to the violation. If the employee is innocent
or has a defense of extenuating circumstances, a failure to answer questions
or deny the employer's charges tends to lead the employer astray. Hence,
if in the face of such lack of cooperation, the employee is substantially
found innocent after an arbitration hearing, the employer should not be
penalized by an award of back pay. The rationale underlying such principle
is that, at least arguably, the employer might not have discharged or
disciplined the employee if he had cooperated and given the employer his
version of the facts in dispute.
But such principle is not applicable where, as here, the employee is
not alleged to be guilty of violating a specific rule which, because of its
tenuous and ambivalent relationship to work performance and production,
was required to be articulated by the employer. It follows that in such a
case the employee has no duty to answer questions of the employer since
these questions do not pertain to any work-related violation.m
220. Utah Power & Light Co., 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233, 243 (1990) (Winograd,
Arb.).
221. Id. at 243. See also Temtex Prods., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233 (1980) (Rimer,
Arb.).
222. Northern Rebuilders Co., 96 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1, 4 (1990) (Canner, Arb.).
223. Id. at 4.
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Although Arbitrator Canner sustained the grievance, it is unclear whether the
grievant was reinstated with backpay.
As a general rule, even when the grievant is ultimately successful on the
merits, arbitral authority supports the proposition that resort to self-help, rather
than to the grievance procedure, will disqualify an employee from the right to
"make whole" back-pay relief.224 An exception with respect to those
employees who resort to self-help is suggested by Prasow and Peters. They
point out that, in these exceptional cases, employees may rely on two basic
criteria applied by the courts when considering petitions for injunctive relief:
1. Will the damage suffered by the petitioner be irreparable if he subse-
quently proved to be the victim of an illegal wrongful action?
2. Will the damage to the petitioner be substantial enough to warrant
restraining the other party, who might be subsequently proved to be in the
right, and in turn suffer needless harassment, perhaps irreparable damage,
by the restraining order?2
They argue that if the employee could meet these tests, it would seem
inappropriate for an arbitrator to take an inflexible position against self-
help.2
6
b. Refusals to Submit to a Polygraph Test 7
Although now significantly limited by statute,22 when permitted by
224. Besides the cases discussed in this section, see Neimand Indus., 88 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) para. 8070 (1987) (Sergent, Arb.) (no back pay where grievant
uncooperative in production of documents and information relating to grievance); Gulf
At. Distribution Servs., 87 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) para. 8013 (1986) (Williams,
Arb.) (reinstatement, but no back pay for insubordination and withholding information).
225. P. PRASOW & E. PETERS, ARBITRATION AND CoLLEcTVE BARGAINING 224
(1970).
226. Id. at 225-30.
227. An expanded discussion of this issue is found in M. HILL & A. SINICROPI,
supra note 119, at 199-228.
228. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 ("EPPA"), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2001-2009 (1988), prohibits the use of the polygraph by most private-sector
employers for pre-employment screening or random testing. The EPPA also
significantly restricts the use of the polygraph in workplace investigations. Public-
sector employers are excluded from the Act's coverage. Id. § 2006(a). The law does
not apply to tests given by the federal government to certain private individuals
engaged in national security activities. Id. § 2006(b). There is also a security services
exemption for firms whose primary business consists of providing armored car
personnel, personnel engaged in the design, installation and maintenance of security
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law, employees may be disciplined for refusal to submit to a polygraph test.
Arbitrators are in sharp disagreement on this issue. With respect to constitu-
tional and privacy considerations, the better rule has been stated by Arbitrator
Stanley Sergent, Jr., in Orthodox Jewish Home for the Aged.229 He held that
management had the right to require employees to submit to a polygraph
examination as part of an investigation of an assault and robbery at a nursing
home (despite the fact that not all employees were required to take the
test).3 Arbitrator Sergent disposed of constitutional and privacy arguments
by asserting that the "easy answer" is simply that the Constitution applies only
to state action against an individual or property and does not govern the
alarm systems, or other uniformed or plainclothes security personnel. Id. § 2006(e).
A major exemption is the "ongoing investigation" exception where an employer
may request a current employee submit to a polygraph if the employee meets four
conditions: (1) the test must be administered in conjunction with an ongoing
investigation involving economic loss or injury to the employer's business (id.
§ 2006(d)(1)); (2) the employee has access to property that is the subject to the
investigation (id. § 2006(d)(2)); (3) the employer had reasonable suspicion that the
subject was involved in the activity or incident under investigation (id. § 2006(d)(3));
and (4) the employer executes a statement setting forth the specific incident under
investigation and provides it to the examinee 48 hours before the testing (id.
§ 2006(d)(4)).
The statute also mandates that additional supporting evidence, beyond the results
of the test or refusal to take the test, is required before an employee can be discharged,
disciplined, or denied promotion, or otherwise discriminated against in any manner.
Id. § 2007(a)(1). Any employee affected by an employer violation may commence a
private civil action, id. § 2005(c)(1), and is entitled to such legal or equitable relief
as may be appropriate. Id. § 2005(c)(1). Administration of tests to determine whether
an employee has used drugs is prohibited. 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(d) (1988). See also
City of Warrensville Heights v. Jennings, 6 IER Cas. (BNA) 597, 597-99 (Ohio 1991)
(just cause existed to deny unemployment compensation and dismiss police officer for
refusal to submit to polygraph to confirm that he was not involved in off-duty drug
use); Jackson v. Hudspeth Center, 6 IER Cas. (BNA) 108, 109 (Miss. 1990) (no due
process violation by state facility for retardation for dismissal of employees refusing
to take polygraph exam during investigation of resident's injury, reasoning "it was the
duty of the appellants to cooperate with Hudspeth Center in the investigation of the
incident."); Eshelman v. Blubaum, 114 Ariz. 376,560 P.2d 1283 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(Upholding dismissal of police officer for refusing to submit to polygraph stating,
"[t]he criteria for determining such a test in the course of an internal investigation are
that the officer must be informed (1) that the questions must relate specifically and
narrowly to the performance of his official duties, (2) that the answers cannot be used
against him in any subsequent criminal prosecution, and (3) that the penalty for refusal
is dismissed .... ).
229. 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 810 (1988) (Sergent, Arb.).
230. Id. at 814-15.
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voluntary relationship between an employer and employee."' Sergent
pointed out that "although compelling and useful in defining the issues raised
in such cases, the analogy to constitutional law in labor arbitration is
limited. ,z13 Constitutional rights "protect the individual from unwarranted
intrusion by the state and they do not readily translate into the more voluntary
and private relationship between employer and employee."033 No unrestricted
parallel to labor arbitration exists, according to Sergent.z 4
With respect to the employee's privacy rights, the Arbitrator concluded
that "the employee's personal integrity and rights of privacy are and should
be recognized and jealously protected in labor arbitration settings just as they
are in criminal constitutional law.' 2tus He noted, however, that in both
settings "the individual's right of privacy is not absolute, yielding instead at
times to more compelling social interests. 'tu 6 In the arbitrator's eyes, the
polygraph itself is no more inherently intrusive upon individual privacy "than
other accepted means of gathering evidence and determining truth such as
taking blood or urine tests or even fingerprinting."1u 7 In light of the evidence
record, the arbitrator, while denying the grievance, ordered that the employee
either be discharged or be given another chance to take the polygraph test,
"the refusal of which will result in his discharge being upheld herein.""us
Similarly, in Grocers Supply Co., 9 Arbitrator Ralph Roger Williams
upheld the dismissal of an employee for refusing to take a lie detector test
where the employee, upon being hired, signed the following statement: "I,
[grievant], do hereby. agree to submit to a Polygraph Test during my
employment for Grocers Supply Company at any time the company may
request. I fully understand that refusal to do so will be sufficient cause for
dismissal."240
When the company was notified by the local police department that a
vehicle registered in the name of an employee had been found containing
some $5,000 worth of the company's merchandise, the employer asked him





235. Id. at 816.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 815-16.
238. Id. at 816.
239. 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27 (1980) (Williams, Arb.).
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polygraph examiner decided not to take the test.32 After declaring that the
eventual use of the test results and whether they would be admissible in an
arbitration hearing was not at issue, Arbitrator Williams ruled that employees
may be required to undergo polygraph tests as a part of an investigation.243
They may be disciplined or discharged for refusal to submit to such a test.
This is especially true when the employees sign a statement when they are
hired agreeing to submit to a polygraph test during their employment at any
time the employer may request. According to the arbitrator, the company
acted properly in dismissing the employee because he "refused to follow
instructions, and failed to do what he had agreed to do when he was
hired."2"4
A case discussing the employee's duty to cooperate with management is
Allen Industries, Inc. 245 After a supervisor found company materials in two
cars parked next to the company's warehouse, the police were called to the
scene to question the owners. Both of the employee-owners were taken to the
police station and asked to submit to a polygraph. 6 One employee
submitted to the test and admitted participating in the theft. The grievant
denied knowing how the materials came to be in his car and refused a
polygraph examination. 247 He was subsequently suspended by the compa-
ny. 2' A grievance was filed requesting that he be reinstated. Arbitrator
Joseph Kiamon, in denying the grievance, focused on the employee's duty to
cooperate with management, and not on the guilt or innocence of the grievant.
In the words of the arbitrator, the grievant's refusal to take a test "even after
the Arbitrator has afforded an opportunity to take such a test at any time
within ten days of the hearing does not indicate guilt or innocence in any
way."249 Rather, it indicates "a complete failure to respond affirmatively to
requests that appear to us to be reasonable to cooperate with the Company in
its effort to find out who was responsible for what happened." zS°
Arbitrator Klamon went on to state that management does not have the
right "out of a clear sky to walk out into the plant and to demand that any
employees of its selection serve as a spy or as an informer upon fellow
employees."'" According to the arbitrator,
242. Id.
243. Id. at 28-29.
244. Id. at 29.
245. 26 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 363 (1956) (Klamon, Arb.).
246. Id. at 364.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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while the Company may not require any employee at random or selected in
a capricious manner to serve as an informer upon other employees, under
pain of discharge, nevertheless it is the duty of every employee to assist the
Company in every way to prevent theft of its property or material used in
manufacture. 
2
Arbitrator Charles Laughlin, in the often-quoted Bowman Transportation,
Inc.,2 3 decision likewise rejected the argument that forcing an employee to
submit to a polygraph had constitutional-type infirmities. He reasoned that
"constitutional principles, as such, do not limit the activity of non-governmen-
tal organizations." 2 4
There may be infirmities with crediting results of a polygraph test, such
as its scientific unreliability or the qualifications of the examiner, but there
should be no issue as to the constitutional question. Arbitrators who hold
otherwise 55 are not applying the law correctly.
Labor arbitrators may endorse an employee's duty to cooperate, but many
have taken a hard stand against management when it comes to the issue of the
polygraph. If management wants the right to discipline an employee for
refusing to take a polygraph exam in an investigation of a theft, it should
secure that right in the collective bargaining agreement. In the absence of
clear language, the ability to require a polygraph is not an inherent manage-
ment right.
6. Refusals to Testify in Arbitration Proceedings
When, if ever, should an employee be permitted not to testify on behalf
of management in an arbitration proceeding? Are there situations where a
refusal to testify is protected under the National Labor Relations Act?
Section 8(a)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,u"
provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer ... "(4) to
discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee because he has filed
252. Id.
253. 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 549 (1973) (Laughlin, Arb.).
254. Id. at 552. See also Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1104 (1982)
(Traynor, Arb.) (holding that plant guards have a special duty to submit to polygraph
tests); Warwick Elect., Inc., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 96 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.) (holding
that tests could be required where labor agreement required guards to cooperate with
management).
255. See, e.g., Lag Drug Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1121, 1122-23 (1962)
(Kelliher, Arb.) (citing rights of privacy and the constitutional right against self-
incrimination).
256. See M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 119, at 199-228.
257. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1988).
[Vol. 56
48
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/1
EMPLOYEES AND INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
charges or given testimony under this act."' 8  In NLRB v. Scrivener (AA
Electric Co.),259 the United States Supreme Court rejected the view that this
section serves only to protect against reprisal for filing an unfair labor practice
charge or for giving testimony at a formal hearing. Rejecting a literal
interpretation of Section 8(a)(4), the Court held that this section afforded
broad protection to an employee who participates in the investigative stage of
an NLRB proceeding, including giving a written statement to a field
examiner.m The NLRB, expanding this doctrine, has found a violation
where an employee was disciplined because the employer suspected that a
charge was about to be filed.261
Related to the arbitral process is Ebasco Services, Inc., where a
three-member Board held that an employer violated the statute by demoting
three foremen who testified at an arbitral proceeding.23 Consistent with the
rationale of Scrivener, the three-member Board declared that:
General Counsel argues that the same rule should apply [protecting
employees from reprisal for giving testimony] where employees resort to
contractual grievance procedures to vindicate their rights under such
contract, and supervisors take it on themselves to appear before tribunals
created under those procedures. This argument has merit, for the Act itself
recognizes and favors employees' right to use, and actual use of, contract
grievance procedures to settle labor disputes, and so do the courts. The
Board has specifically protected employees from employer interference with
their right to resort to such procedures under contracts, as well as proce-
dures before outside tribunals, to enforce contract rights, on the theory that
the filing of claims by employees in either instance was a form of
implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and thus an
extension of the concerted activity which gave rise to that agreement. In
addition, the Board has long followed the statutory policy by withholding
its processes in deference to an arbitrator's award under contract procedures
where the arbitral process meets certain standards of fairness and regularity.
Therefore, it appears to be no more than a reasonable extension of the
above principle and Board policy to say that employees have a corollary
right to a full and fair hearing on their grievances under contract procedures
which must likewise be protected from interference or limitation.2 4
258. Id.
259. 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
260. Id. at 123.
261. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 95 (1974).
262. 181 N.L.R.B. 768 (1970).
263. Id. at 768-69.
264. Id. at 769-70.
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Accordingly, an employee who is subject to discriminatory treatment
because he has given testimony at an arbitration proceeding may be granted
relief under the Taft-Hartley Act. There is no safe harbor for an employee
who testifies falsely at an arbitration hearing. An employee who gives false
statements before an arbitrator can be disciplined notwithstanding the
statute.2
In Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. NLRB,2 the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit overturned an NLRB per se rule that an employer may never use
a threat of discipline to compel employees to respond to questions relating to
a grievance proceeding that has been scheduled for arbitration. 2 7  In that
case the employer's attorney sought to interview two employees (Whitwell and
Rittermeyer), one of whom was a union representative (Whitwell), in
preparation for a discharge grievance scheduled for an arbitration hearing.2
Although told that the employees were not the subject of the investigation and
would not be disciplined for truthful answers, management nevertheless made
it clear that they would be subject to discipline for not cooperating. Both
employees answered the questions under protest.269 Neither employee was
asked whether he would testify at the upcoming arbitration or whether he had
been requested to testify.270 After the interviews the union filed an unfair
labor practice charge, alleging that management violated section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by threatening employees with disciplinary action because of their
engaging in concerted activity.271
The Administrative Law Judge ("AD") found a violation, reasoning that
management improperly coerced the employees "when it threatened them with
discipline if they refused to cooperate by providing information to [manage-
ment] in the course of its preparation for arbitration .... ,,272 As an
265. M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 119, at 80, assert the following:
While an employer, governed by the National Labor Relations Act, may not
discharge an employee for testifying at an arbitration proceeding, testifying
dishonestly is not a protected activity. Thus, an employee-witness who
deliberately gives false statements in an arbitration hearing is himself
subject to dismissal.
Id. (footnote omitted). The authors cite two arbitration decisions for this proposition,
Wright-Bemet, Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) para. 8071, at 3321 (1981)
(Strasshofer, Arb.) and Pacific Steel Casting Co., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 984 (1981)
(Letter, Arb.).
266. 648 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
267. Id. at 713-14.
268. Id. at 713.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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alternative holding, the AIJ ruled that "[e]ven if it were to be held that
employees generally may not refuse to be interviewed by their employers in
preparation for arbitration of a grievance, such rule could not appropriately be
applied to Whitwell, who was the shop steward in Thompson's depart-
ment.I2T The ALT thus found the interrogation of the steward to be an
independent violation of the Act. The Board, applying what appeared to be
a blanket rule, ruled that "an employer that seeks to compel its employees to
submit to questioning in such circumstances violates Section 8(a)(1)."274
Reversing the Board, the appellate court found that the rule announced
by the Board "unnecessarily and impermissibly interferes with the manner in
which parties to a collective bargaining relationship structure the arbitration
process."275 The court instead held that the legality of pre-arbitration
interviews is a contractual matter, "subject only to the normal restraints
imposed by the Act that employer conduct not be unlawfully coercive in a
particular case. "276 Given the routine practice of parties to interview witness-
es days prior to the arbitration, the court found that the Board's rule
"established by substantial evidence than an employer demand for a pre-
arbitration interview coerces employees in the exercise of protected legal
rights."2" The court went on to note
at that interview, an employer advocate may, perhaps for. the first time,
obtain factual information from witnesses, observe demeanor, and in general
evaluate the merits of a pending dispute. On the basis of the record
established by the Board, we are unable to perceive the manner in which
such a limited investigation coerces protected employee rights. As a result,
we hold that an employee does not have an automatic right to refuse to
respond to questions concerning a matter that had been scheduled for arbitation. 78
The court, however, was careful to designate limits as to how far management
may inquire as follows:
An employer may in certain cases be forbidden from inquiring into matters
that are not job-related. An employer also may be prohibited from prying
into union activities, or using the interview as an excuse to discover the
union strategies for arbitration. In short, we do not here suggest that
employers have a carte blanche license to interrogate employees prior to
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 716.
276. Id.
277. Id at 716.
278. Id. at 716-18.
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arbitration; the limits provided by Section 8(a)(1) remain available to
prohibit employer conduct in an individual case.279
Can the holding in Cook Paint & Varnish Co. be extended to the situation
where an employer wants to compel an employee to testify on management's
behalf at an arbitration proceeding?
In a particularly instructive case, Retail Store Employees Union, Local
876,28 an employee (Anna Pennacchini) of Local 876 was discharged
because of her refusal to testify in favor of her employer, in this case Local
876.2" Her testimony was requested at an unfair labor practice proceeding
at which a fellow employee (Frazier) was attempting to "vindicate her
statutory rights." 2 Pennacchini first argued that her testimony would have
been false because she had no direct knowledge of the matters about which
she was to be questioned and that her refusal to testify falsely was protected
under section 8(a)(4) of the Act.28 The employer-union maintained that it
had interviewed Pennacchine in regard to its investigation of violations
committed by Frazier.28 Pennacchini had related information to her
employer and later flatly refused to testify as to the veracity of the informa-
tion.' 5 The employer did not subpoena Pennacchini at Frazier's hear-
ing.28 The Board concluded that management violated sections 8(a)(4) and
8(a)(1) of the Act when the employer terminated Pennacchini "because she
refused to appear voluntarily as a witness in the unfair labor practice
proceeding involving a former co-worker, on the ground that she had no direct
knowledge of the matters about which she was to be questioned." 7
What would the Board's ruling have been if Pennacchini refused to
testify on the grounds that her testimony would hurt the union or a fellow
bargaining-unit employee? Further, assuming that the employee refuses to
testify even with truthful information, does the employer have any alternative
to discharge?
Neither the NLRB nor the courts have ruled on the issue whether an
employee's refusal to testify at an arbitration hearing is protected under the
Act. The rights protected in Retail Store Employees Union, Local 876,
however, could arguably be applied to such a situation.
279. Id. at 718.
280. 219 N.L.R.B. 1188 (1975).
281. Id. at 1188-89.
282. Id. at 1189.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1190-91.
286. Id. at 1192.
287. Id. at 1194.
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Additionally, the employer is not left unprotected in his search for the
truth. Another line of NLRB decisions address the non-discharge alternative
that is available to management. Enforcement of the arbitrator's subpoena is
available through the courts as an enforcement of the arbitrator's power to
compel production of material evidence under section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley).m Further, federal and state
arbitration statutes may provide enforcement power. The subpoena process,
according to the Board, is clearly available provided that the testimony sought
is "not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of [the party
issuing the subpoenas]."2 9
Following this argument, the Board would likely find that an employee's
refusal to testify is protected under the Act even though he is refusing to
cooperate with management. As such, management will not be allowed to
discharge an individual. Rather, the employer's remedy is a court-enforced
subpoena if the testimony requested is relevant and truthful to the outcome of
the hearing.
In this same regard, it is also illustrative of the employer's rights that the
Board was faced with the issue of whether a union steward could be
suspended because he tried to prevent other employees from cooperating with
management's investigation of employee misconduct. In Manville Forest
Products Corp.,'9° the Board held unprotected a steward's directive to
employees not to tell management what they had heard and seen, but to state
that they had not seen or heard anything.29' The NLRB rejected the
argument that the conduct was protected because the steward did not
personally refuse to cooperate but simply, in his role as union representative,
advised others not to answer.292 The Board, applying Cook Paint & Varnish
Co.,293 reasoned that the employer could have compelled the employees to
cooperate in the investigation. According to the Board, "it is within an
employer's legitimate prerogative to investigate misconduct in its plant and to
do so without interference from any of its employees-including those who
are union officials." a The Board made it clear that a steward cannot look
288. 29 U.S.C. § 141-197 (1959). See M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 119,
at 82; 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 121-36
(1991).
289. Rolligon Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 122 (1981) (citing Endocott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943)).
290. 269 N.L.R.B. 390 (1984).
291. Id. at 391.
292. Id.
293. 264 N.L.R.B. 646 (1979).
294. Manville Forest, 269 N.L.R.B. at 391.
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to his status as a union official for protection when advising employees not
to cooperate.,
5
7. Failing to Cooperate with Unions
Although beyond the scope of this Article but related to the above
discussion, unions, like employers, are often confronted with individuals who
refuse to cooperate in internal investigations. Such was the case in Simmons
v. Local 713, Textile Workers,296 where an individual was disciplined for
"non cooperation" when he refused to sign a release indicating that a
polygraph test (about to be administered by the union investigating stolen
election ballots) was taken voluntarily.2 97 More commonly, individuals
witness events, but for whatever reason, refuse to tell union leadership what
they know or refuse to attend an arbitration hearing for fear of management
reprisals. Can a labor organization fine or otherwise expel from membership
in the union an individual for refusing to cooperate?
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, also
known as the Landrum-Griffin Act,298 and specifically Title I of the Act, the
so-called "Bill of Rights" section, provides safeguards against improper
disciplinary action against a covered union member. Section 101(a)(5)
provides that "[n]o member may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined.., unless such member has been (A) served with written specific
charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; [and] (C) afforded
a full and fair hearing."m Under Taft-Hartley, a union commits an unfair
295. Id.
296. 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965).
297. Id.
298. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1959).
299. Id. § 401. The following decisions relate the interpretive history of the
section: Amalgamated Transit Union, No. 825, 240 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1979) (extending
Cannery protection to employee who made statement adverse to co-worker's position
during pendency of grievance); Cannery Warehousemen, Local No. 788,190 N.L.R.B.
24, 27 (1971) ("It is essential to the existence of the arbitration process that witnesses
testify before the arbitrator without fear of reprisal from either the employer or the
union."). Accord Oil Workers Local No. 7-103, 269 N.L.R.B. 129, 130 (1984), where
two union employees signed statements alleging that another employee had violated
certain plant rules and were promptly fined by the union with "engaging in conduct
detrimental to the welfare and interests of the membership." The Board, phrasing the
issue as "whether [the union] by fining [the two employees] for alleged violations of
the Union rules, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)," held that "in cases where a union has
fined members for appearing and testifying in arbitration proceedings in a manner
contrary to the interest of other members" the union violated the Act. Id. at 132. See
also United Mine Workers of America, Local 1058, 299 N.L.R.B. 47, 49 (1990)
922 [Vol. 56
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labor practice by fining or otherwise disciplining an individual who testifies
in favor of management. 300 If refusing to appear at an arbitration hearing
is similar to testifying at the hearing itself and is accordingly protected under
the NLRA, then a union will be without power to discipline an employee for
engaging in that activity. If unprotected, a union may arguably assess a fine
or other discipline against a member pursuant to a union rule or constitution,
although under current law a union may discipline its members for offenses
that are not enumerated in its constitution.30' The better view is that unions,
like employers, can subpoena an employee to testify and will not have the
authority to fine recalcitrant employees.
IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
What should be the rule both in the public and private sector when an
employee "takes the fifth" or otherwise refuses to supply management with
information concerning an internal investigation?
As indicated, the law in the public sector amounts to this: when a public
employee is not provided with use immunity, his statements cannot be used
against him unless the statements are voluntarily given. Any threats or actual
discipline against the employee who declares that he is invoking the fifth
amendment is unconstitutional unless immunity is granted. A public employee
granted immunity who refuses to answer questions specifically, directly, and
narrowly related to his official duties may be dismissed. Further, a public
employee may be dismissed when his answers call for dismissal. Finally, if
an affirmative assurance of immunity is not forthcoming from the state's
attorney, it should be given by a non-bargaining-unit supervisor-employer
rather than a co-member of the bargaining unit, even though the latter is a
bona fide "supervisor" with corresponding supervisory authority.
The "rules" are different (and more simple) for private-sector manage-
ment. Most arbitrators correctly hold that the constitutional protections
between the individual and the state are not operative in the private sector.
(Intra-union charges against a union member were filed because the member testified
on behalf of his employer and against another union member at an arbitration hearing.
The Board stated: "the point is that a union may not discipline or even try a union
member for the member's participation in the grievance/arbitration process." Id. Such
an action, according to the Board, restrained and coerced the employee's section 7
rights. Id.); Freight Drivers & Helpers Local No. 577, 218 N.L.R.B. 1117 (1975)
(finding violation of Act where union held disciplinary hearing regarding testimony
against union steward at arbitration hearing).
300. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1947).
301. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 244-45
(1971) (it is "a futile exercise for a court to construe the [union's] written rules in
order to determine whether particular conduct falls within or without their scope.").
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There are some arbitrators who still have it wrong, °2 but they are in the
minority and their views and logic are suspect. In deciding cases arbitrators
may consider all relevant factors, including, as Professor Meltzer has
observed, "those values embodied in statutes and the Constitution-values that
help shape standards of justice not only in the plant, but also in the larger
community."3°3 But arbitrators should not conclude that private-sector
employees are somehow protected by the fifth amendment in their dealings
with management. The analogy to constitutional rights may sometimes be
useful, but as stated by one arbitrator, "it is limited and those rights cannot be
applied unqualifiedly to industrial disputes. 00
4
With respect to justifying the holdings by private-sector arbitrators, an
argument can be made that an employee should elect "who he wants to work
for" and what he is attempting to maximize. If he is afraid of the "wolves and
giants" in the woods30 5 (i.e., if he is a "risk-averter"), then he should remain
302. See, e.g., the decision of Arbitrator Joseph Baird in King Co., 89 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 681 (1987) (Baird, Arb.), where he declares: "There can be no doubt
whatsoever that to use the threat of termination or suspension to seek a confession of
criminal conduct clearly impinges upon the Fifth Amendment rights of the grievants."
Id. at 685. See also Temtex Products, Inc., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233, 237 (1980)
(Rimer, Arb.) (Holding that an order to submit to a polygraph test was analogous to
refusing to follow instructions that would place the employee in imminent danger to
his health and safety, and that "it exposes the employee to another sort of danger, that
of self-incrimination, by forcing the revelation of information which may be placed in
the hands of the employer to his future detriment, whether accurate or not, and whether
or not material to the investigation at hand.").
303. Meltzer, LaborArbitration andDis'crimination: The Parties'Process and the
Public's Purposes, 43 U. CHI. L. RaV. 724, 728 (1976) (cited in General Plant &
Chemical Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 413, 415 (1983) (Kossoff, Arb.) (holding that
management had right to introduce metal detector and random inspection procedures
at plant, stating that the "Fourth Amendment grants the individual a right of privacy
vis a vis the federal government .... )).
304. Orthodox Jewish Home for the Aged, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 810, 815 (1988)
(Sergent, Arb.).
305. Cf. Though it's dark,
There are always wolves,
There are always beans





Every now and then.
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silent (perhaps even taking the fifth) and not cooperate in the employer's
investigation of wrongdoing. Management, however, should not be forced to
carry such an employee on its payroll. Termination accordingly may be
appropriate, at least in the case where the employer can demonstrate a bona
fide need for the information, and the misconduct investigated is the subject
of a plant rule, or alternatively, the employee has been forewarned of the
employer's concern. Employees have every right to protect themselves from
criminal charges by invoking the fifth amendment, but they should not expect
job tenure when they refuse to cooperate in their employers' legitimate
investigation. As well put by one arbitrator, "the grievant had a right to make
himself 200 percent secure against criminal involvement, but he cannot
simultaneously protect his rights to future employment when his position
frustrated the legitimate right and interest of the Company [to investigate a
theft]. ' ' °
The fact that the employee is a public-sector employee, and as such,
enjoys a constitutional umbrella relative to his private-sector counterpart, may
be fortuitous. The Garrity, Gardner, and Leftowitz decisions, however, would
seem to mandate that an arbitrator operating in the public sector at the very
least takes into consideration the constitutional rights of employees who "take
the fifth" during an investigation.30 7 Like the courts, we see no infirmity
when an arbitrator "looks to the law" for guidance and resolves any doubt in
favor of the public-sector grievant °
But not too fast
Or what you wish
You lose at last.
Into The Woods, music and lyrics by Stephen Sondheim.
306. Simonize Co., 44 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658, 663-64 (1964) (McGury, Arb.).
307. See, e.g., Regional Transp. Dist., 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 117, 123-24 (1989)
(Hogler, Arb.) ("[b]y virtue of the Company's status as a public employer, its
employees are covered under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution .... );
City of Omaha & The Omaha City Employees, Local 251, No. 90-00359 (Lab. Arb.
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library) (reinstating employee discharged for refusing to be
interviewed in employer's investigation of homicide, applying Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 78 (1978), and holding that management did not grant grievant immunity
from criminal prosecution).
308. Frequently, either at the parties' request or even on his own motion, an
arbitrator will fashion a remedy consistent with or patterned after external law. Indeed,
in the federal sector, remedies must conform to the mandates of law and agency
regulations. Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985) (holding that federal-sector
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The obligation and authority of a labor arbitrator to interpret and apply the law
when resolving grievances has been the subject of much discussion and litigation, both
in the legal and arbitral forum. See generally A. Cox, The Place of Law in Labor
Arbitration, The Profession of Labor Arbitration, in SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE
FIRST SEVEN ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1948-
54, at 76 (1957); R. HOwLTr, supra note 64, at 67; B. MELTZER, RuminationsAbout
Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB, AND THE
COURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS 1 (1967); R. MrrENHALL, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 42 (1968);
M. SOVERN, When ShouldArbitrators Follow FederalLaw? in ARBITRATION AND THE
EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 29 (1970). Two situations are to
be distinguished. In the first situation, the contractual and statutory standards are not
in conflict, but overlap. In this case, few argue that arbitrators should ignore external
law when a contractual provision is ambiguous and can be interpreted in two
ways-one consistent with the law and one inconsistent therewith. The second, and
more difficult, situation involves the case where a conflict exists between the
agreement and a statute. The orthodox position is that an arbitrator's decision is
constrained by the collective bargaining agreement, and when there is conflict the
arbitrator should respect the agreement and ignore the law. A contrary position argues
that "arbitrators should render decisions on the issues before them based on both
contract language and law." R. HOWLETr, supra note 64, at 83.
This position is based on the following considerations: (1) The rationale that
"each contract includes all applicable law, which becomes part of the essence of the
collective bargaining agreement to which Justice Douglas has referred in the Enterprise
Wheel decision; (2) the policy of the NLRB, first enunciated in Spielberg, favoring the
arbitral determination of legal issues, and (3) the notion that "an arbitrator who decides
a dispute without consideration of legal issues disserves his management-union
clients." Id.
Several commentators have proposed solutions somewhere between the Meltzer
and Howlett positions. Archibald Cox has argued that an arbitrator should look to the
statutes in order to avoid rendering an award the would require the parties to violate
the law. A. Cox, supra, at 78-79. Cox states that this position does not suggest that
an arbitrator should pass upon all the parties' legal rights and obligations, nor does it
suggest that an arbitrator should refuse to give effect to a contract provision merely
because the courts would not enforce it. Moreover, it does not imply that an arbitrator
should be guided by judge-made rules of evidence or contract interpretation. According
to Cox, the principle "requires only that the arbitrator look to see whether sustaining
the grievances would require conduct the law forbids or would enforce an illegal
contract; if so, the arbitrator should not sustain the grievance." Id.
Arbitrator Richard Mittenthal, asserting that, on balance, the relevant consider-
ations support Cox's view, nevertheless refined Cox's position by stating that the
arbitrator should "look to see whether sustaining the grievance would require conduct
[Vol. 56
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Still, the arbitrator must make it clear that his award is based on the
parties' labor agreement, and not what the law may require. To do otherwise
may result in having the award overturned.3°
the law forbids or would enforce an illegal contact; if so, the arbitrator should not
sustain the grievance." R. MITrrNTHAL, supra, at 50. This principle, however, should
be carefully limited. It does not suggest that "an arbitrator should refuse to give effect
to a contract provision merely because the courts would not enforce it." Id. Thus,
although the arbitrator's award may permit conduct forbidden by law but sanctioned
by contract, it should not require conduct forbidden by law even though sanctioned by
contract.
Michael Sovem offers a more detailed compromise to the debate, listing the
following criteria which should be satisfied before an arbitrator entertains a legal issue:
1. The arbitrator is qualified.
2. The question of law is implicated in a dispute over the application or
interpretation of a contract that is also before him.
3. The question of law is raised by a contention that, if the conduct
complained of does violate the contract, the law nevertheless immunizes or
even requires it.
4. The courts lack primary jurisdiction to adjudicate the questions of law.
M. SOVERN, supra, at 38.
Similar to Sovem, Scheinholtz and Miscimarra argue that is it not instructive to
ask whether arbitrators should or shouldn't consider statutory issues. Rather, if
arbitration is to be preserved as a practical, expeditious, and final method of dispute
resolution under the parties' labor agreement, the more helpful query is "whether and
under what circumstances is the consideration of statutory issues appropriate."
Scheinholtz & Miscimarra, The Arbitrator as Judge and Jury: Another Look at
Statutory Law in Arbitration, 40 ARB. J. 55 (1985). Scheinholtz and Miscimarra note
that it is impossible to formulate a single answer to the question of whether statutory
issues should be considered by an arbitrator. The authors maintain that four "guiding
principles" should be considered when determining whether an arbitrator should
consider external law: (1) the authority of the arbitrator (whether the parties explicitly
indicate in their labor agreement that an arbitrator cannot consider issues of external
law); (2) arbitral expertise (is the arbitrator competent to resolve the statutory issue?);
(3) arbitration hearing procedures (will the parties' procedure enable a fair resolution
of the issue?); and (4) the finality or "nonredundancy" of the procedure (does an
arbitrator ever perform a service by handing down an award from its inception is
predestined not to be enforced?). Id. at 55-57. Consideration of statutory issues will
vary depending on a balancing of these factors.
309. In Roadmaster Corp. v. Production & Maintenance Employees' Local 504,
851 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1988), the Seventh Circuit made it clear that an arbitrator's
authority derives from the parties' contract, and that an arbitrator is not to stray from
his obligation to interpret the labor agreement. Because Roadmaster breached section
8(d)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the arbitrator concluded that the
employer's letter to the union was insufficient notice under the applicable contract to
terminate the current labor agreement. Id. at 888 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
1991]
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Because of privacy considerations, employees who refuse to participate
in an investigation calling for a drug or polygraph examination appear to
enjoy a different status in the arbitral community. Arbitrators have concluded
that talking to management about a theft is different from providing the
company with a urine sample or being wired to a machine. Accordingly,
employers intent on sustaining discipline or discharge for refusing these tests
should 1) negotiate that right in the collective bargaining agreement, or 2)
formulate a plant rule calling for testing upon reasonable suspicion that the
employee is under the influence, or in the case of polygraph testing, is
involved in a work-related misconduct.
In a well-reasoned opinion permitting management to use a polygraph as
part of an investigation of an assault and robbery, Arbitrator Stanley Sergent
reasoned that the appropriateness of the intrusion of the employee's privacy
cannot be determined in the abstract:
Instead, a careful balancing must be made of such factors as the seriousness
of one's conduct being investigated, its relevance to the employee's fitness
to work and the Employer's consequent interest in investigating it, and the
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)). In Alexander, the court observed [h]is [the arbitrator's]
source of authority is the collective bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and
apply that agreement in accordance with the industrial common law of the shop and
the various needs and desires of the parties. The arbitrator, however, has no general
authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of
industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources,
yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an
infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award.
Id. at 888-89 (emphasis added) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
The Alexander court further stated "If an arbitral decision is based solely upon
the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation, rather than on an
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator has exceeded the
scope of the submission, and the award will not be enforced." Id. at 889 (emphasis
added).
In no uncertain terms, the Seventh Circuit stated that is "plainly wrong" for an
arbitrator to base a decision upon his view of the requirements of enacted legislation.
Roadmaster, 851 F.2d at 889. With regard to applying law, the court stated that:
"Arbitrators should restrict their considerations to the contract, even if such a decision
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EMPLOYEES AND INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
reasonableness of the Employer's focus of suspicion on the employee who
is asked to submit to examination. 1
We submit that arbitrators, in all duty-to-cooperate cases, apply a similar
balancing test that takes into account the criteria outlined by Sergent. Our
argument is that a careful analysis of the competing factors will result in
recognition of an employee's obligation to truthfully provide management with
information independent of any constitutional infirmities. Management should
insist that employees truthfully state what they know of work-related
misconduct as a condition of future employment. Recognition of an
employee's right to stand silent should be forthcoming only in those situations
where the questions do not relate to the performance of the employee's official
duties. A presumption ought to operate in favor of disclosure. Absent clear
and convincing evidence that silence is warranted, arbitrators should give due
consideration to management's legitimate need for information.
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